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ABSOLUTE PRIORITY REDUX: FIRST-DAY
ORDERS AND PRE-PLAN SETTLEMENTS IN
CHAPTER 11 POST-JEVIC
BRUCE GROHSGAL
ABSTRACT
This Article considers the problem of priority-skipping distributions made by a chapter 11 debtor outside of a plan, following
the Supreme Court’s Jevic decision.1 The Jevic Court extended the
absolute priority rule—which under U.S. bankruptcy enactments
dictates the order of distributions to creditors under a chapter 11
cramdown plan and in a chapter 7 liquidation—to a chapter 11
case-ending settlement known as a “structured dismissal.”
The Jevic Court limited its holding to a case-ending settlement. It did not extend the absolute priority rule to an interim or
pre-plan settlement or other transaction that is not case-ending or
to a “first-day” distribution made at the very beginning of a chapter 11 case.2 The Court expressed no view about the legality of structured dismissals in general and did not define when a settlement
Bruce Grohsgal, Helen S. Balick Professor in Business Bankruptcy Law,
Delaware Law School, Widener University, Wilmington, Delaware. The author
gratefully acknowledges the insightful comments of the Honorable Frank J.
Santoro, the Honorable Laurie S. Silverstein, Professor David A. Skeel, Jr.,
Michael L. Temin, and Hobart G. Truesdell, who read a draft of this Article.
The author thanks the editors of the William & Mary Business Law Review
for inviting this sequel to Bruce Grohsgal, How Absolute Is the Absolute Priority Rule in Bankruptcy? The Case for Structured Dismissals, 8 WM. & MARY
BUS. L. REV. 439 (2017). The author, prior to joining the full-time faculty of
Delaware Law School in July 2014 and while at his former firm, participated
in the In re Jevic Holding Corp. case cited in this Article. The author resigned
from his former firm on June 30, 2014.
1 Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., 137 S. Ct. 973 (2017).
2 The Jevic Court used the term “interim” to refer to settlements and other
transactions that are not case-ending and are entered into outside of a chapter 11 plan. I use the terms “interim” and “pre-plan” interchangeably in this
Paper to refer to such settlements and other transactions. Czyzewski, 137 S.
Ct. at 975, 985.
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other than a “structured dismissal” is case-ending. It emphasized,
without much in the way of details, that the Code’s priority system was a “basic underpinning of business bankruptcy law” that
must be safeguarded even with respect to a pre-plan transaction.3
This Article considers these issues of pre-plan or “interim”
settlements and first-day distributions left open by Jevic. It asserts
that Jevic is best characterized as a transaction among insiders
and parties asserted to have colluded with them, that assertedly
provided for a distribution of estate assets to the settling parties
based on their control and collusion, supported by a hypothetical
rather than a market valuation of ultimate distributional outcomes.
This issue—the use of control and collusion supported by a hypothetical valuation to obtain an unfair distribution or “control
premium”—is the precise issue that gave rise to the absolute priority rule 150 years ago and that concerned the Court in 203 N.
LaSalle, the last case before Jevic in which the Court extensively
considered the absolute priority rule in chapter 11.4 First-day
relief in chapter 11 presents a similar though not identical valuation dilemma: can a hypothetical prediction made early in the case
of ultimate distributions to creditors reliably determine that some
prepetition claims should be paid at the first-day hearing because such payments ultimately will benefit (or at least will not
harm) the remaining creditors who are not favored?
This Article proposes that a proper solicitude is shown for
the absolute priority rule when an interim or pre-plan settlement
or other transaction with an insider, secured lender or other party
who exercises some control over the debtor is subjected to higher
bids in a market sale process such as an auction. This approach can
provide a market valuation of the transaction and proposed distributions that can enable a bankruptcy court to determine whether
the transaction includes a premium based on control that is proposed to be paid at the expense of other creditors, thus addressing the
precise mischief sought to be remedied by the absolute priority rule.
The Jevic Court also left open the rule for bankruptcy court
approval of first-day distributions that violate the absolute priority
Id. at 983–84, 986.
Bank of Am. Nat’l Tr. & Sav. Ass’n v. 203 N. LaSalle St. P’ship, 526 U.S.
434 (1999).
3
4
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rule.5 This Article further contends that a market test for a “firstday” distribution to an employee, a critical vendor, or other creditor that is challenged as priority-skipping will be limited to
whether the debtor sought and failed to obtain in the market the
same good, service, or credit from an alternative supplier on the
same or better terms than those proposed to be given by the firstday motion. A bankruptcy court in most cases will not be able to
obtain, at the time of a first-day hearing, a market determination
of what will be distributed to creditors months or years later when
the case ends. And any hypothetical valuation that the court makes
at a first-day hearing of the ultimate distributions to creditors in
the case will be highly unreliable. Because of these obstacles, the
question of whether a first-day payment ultimately will comport
with distributional priorities should be replaced with the question
of whether the debtor sought and failed to obtain an alternative
supply in the market, and by a rebuttable presumption that preserving the going concern value of the chapter 11 debtor is likely,
ultimately, to benefit even the disfavored creditors. This approach—
which essentially adopts the occasionally maligned “doctrine of
necessity” and rejects the Seventh Circuit’s Kmart rule—recognizes
the disturbing weakness of a hypothetical determination made at
the first day hearing of the ultimate distributions at the end of a
chapter 11 case.
I conclude that a bankruptcy court demonstrates a proper
solicitude for the absolute priority rule under both Jevic and 203
N. LaSalle when it relies on market exposure of pre-plan settlements and transactions to preclude control premiums to insiders
or others who have some control over the debtor, and when it bases
approval of first-day relief on a presumption of going concern value,
rather than on speculative, hypothetical predictions of ultimate
distributions to creditors at the end of the case. I suggest that
these approaches to the approval of these types of interim and
pre-plan transactions also can provide the certainty sought by the
Court in Jevic.

Czyzewski, 137 S. Ct. at 985 (the Court nonetheless voiced strong support for such payments on the ground that they “enable a successful reorganization and make even the disfavored creditors better off” (quoting In re Kmart
Corp., 359 F.3d 866, 872 (7th Cir. 2004))).
5
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INTRODUCTION
STRUCTURED DISMISSALS, THE ABSOLUTE PRIORITY RULE, AND THE
PROBLEM IN JEVIC
The settlement and dismissal that the bankruptcy court approved in Jevic was a “structured dismissal.”6 The secured creditors, the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors on behalf of
most of the debtor’s unsecured creditors, and the shareholders entered into a settlement whereby the debtor released a fraudulent
transfer claim against the secured creditors in exchange for their
paying $3.7 million to the bankruptcy estate for distribution to
Jevic’s creditors.7 The settlement further provided that the Court
would dismiss the chapter 11 case immediately thereafter.8
A structured dismissal is a settlement of certain claims asserted by or against the debtor, that provides for proposed distributions on account of those claims, and that the bankruptcy court
approves contemporaneously with its entering its order dismissing the case.9 The debtor in a structured dismissal does not seek
to end the case by confirming a chapter 11 plan after a vote by
impaired classes of creditors, or by converting the case to chapter 7
for liquidation by the chapter 7 trustee.10 Instead, in a structured
See 11 U.S.C. §§ 349, 1112(b)(1) (2012). The term “structured dismissal”
does not appear in the Code (though neither does the term “absolute priority”
or “absolute priority rule”). The legal grounds for a structured dismissal are
constructed from several provisions of the Code and Rules. Section 349 authorizes
the bankruptcy court to dismiss a bankruptcy case, and on the dismissal, any
property remaining in the bankruptcy estate revests “in the entity in which
such property was vested immediately before the commencement of the case”
(which may be the debtor), subject to such conditions as the court, “for cause,”
may order otherwise. § 349(b). The court’s authority to approve the settlement,
and order the distribution of property pursuant to it, is generally located in
§ 363(b), which provides that a chapter 11 debtor, with court approval, may
use, sell, or lease estate property out of the ordinary course of business, and in
Rule 9019, which provides that the bankruptcy court “may approve a compromise or settlement.” FED. R. BANKR. P. 9019.
7 Czyzewski, 137 S. Ct. at 981.
8 Id.
9 American Bankruptcy Institute Commission to Study the Reform of Chapter
11, 2012–2014 Final Report and Recommendations, 23 AM. BANKR. INST. L.
REV. 1, 293 (2015) [hereinafter ABI Report].
10 Id.
6
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dismissal, the case ends with the court’s approval of the settlement terms followed by entry of the dismissal order.11
The problem with the structured dismissal in Jevic was
that the distribution of the settlement proceeds—which the secured
lenders would pay to the estate for the release by the debtor of its
claims against them—would skip over a group of priority unsecured creditors, truck-drivers formerly employed by the debtor
who were terminated contemporaneously with the filing of the
bankruptcy case.12 The drivers had brought their own suit against
the debtor and its owner, Sun Capital Partners, for wage claims
under the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification (WARN)
Act based on the termination of their employment without having been given the sixty days advance notice required by the
WARN Act.13 The drivers’ wage claims were not part of the settlement.14 Wage claims are unsecured priority claims under the
Bankruptcy Code.15 The structured dismissal thus arguably violated the absolute priority rule because the rule required payment
to the drivers prior to the payment made to the lower priority
general unsecured creditors who were being paid part of the settlement proceeds under the structured dismissal.16
The question in Jevic was whether the absolute priority
rule—which applies under the Bankruptcy Code for confirmation
of a chapter 11 cramdown plan and to distributions in a chapter
7 liquidation—also applies to a similarly case-ending structured
dismissal.17 The Bankruptcy Code says nothing of a structured
Id. at 294.
Czyzewski, 137 S. Ct. at 976, 980–81.
13 Id. at 980. The federal WARN Act is codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 2101–2109.
Many states have enacted state WARN statutes that are similar to the federal
WARN Act. The WARN claimants in Jevic brought their action under both
the federal and state WARN statutes.
14 Czyzewski, 137 S. Ct. at 976, 980.
15 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(4) (2012).
16 Czyzewski, 137 S. Ct. at 980–82.
17 Id. at 978. A cramdown plan in chapter 11 is a plan that at least one impaired class of creditors has voted to reject. Such a plan must comply with the
absolute priority rule. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b) (2012). Chapter 7, in contrast to chapter
11, does not allow for the reorganization of a debtor, but instead provides for
the liquidation of the debtor’s assets and the distribution of the proceeds to
creditors. The absolute priority rule also applies to final distributions in a chapter
7 case. 11 U.S.C. § 726 (2012).
11
12
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dismissal and does not expressly provide that the absolute priority rule extends to any dismissal of a chapter 11 case, structured
or otherwise.18
The bankruptcy court in Jevic held that the absolute priority rule did not apply and approved the structured dismissal.19
The district court and the Third Circuit agreed with the bankruptcy
court’s interpretation of the Code and affirmed.20
The Supreme Court reversed. The Court held that a bankruptcy court cannot order a non-consensual priority-skipping
distribution “in connection with a Chapter 11 dismissal.”21
The Court—quoting its last major decision on the absolute
priority rule, 203 N. LaSalle in 1999—emphasized that the rule
developed to address a “concern with the ability of a few insiders,
whether representatives of management or major creditors, to use
the reorganization process to gain an unfair advantage,”22 and to
reduce the risks of “collusion” by which those parties can gain that
advantage and greater value from the estate for themselves by
squeezing out other creditors.23
The Court also expressed its skepticism of the Jevic bankruptcy court’s hypothetical valuations of the claim and the proposed settlement—and of such hypothetical valuations generally.24
In its view, the bankruptcy court’s finding that the settlement
was the only way that any unsecured creditor would receive anything had only “equivocal support” in the record, leading the
Court to “readily imagine other cases that turn on comparably
dubious predictions.”25
The Court expressly declined, though, to extend the absolute
priority rule to pre-plan or “interim” settlements or to “first-day”
distributions in chapter 11.26 Regarding pre-plan or “interim” settlements, the Court stressed the difficulty of applying the absolute
Czyzewski, 137 S. Ct. at 984.
Id. at 982.
20 Id.
21 Id. at 978.
22 Id. at 987 (quoting Bank of Am. Nat’l Tr. & Sav. Ass’n v. 203 N. LaSalle
St. P’ship, 526 U.S. 434, 444 (1999)) (internal quotations omitted).
23 Czyzewski, 137 S. Ct. at 987.
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 Id. at 983–85.
18
19
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priority rule because the nature and extent of the chapter 11
estate have not yet been fully resolved.27 The Court also stated
that “one can generally find significant Code-related objectives”
for priority-skipping “first-day” relief.28 It suggested nonetheless
that a bankruptcy court must demonstrate a “proper solicitude” for
the absolute priority rule in substantial, pre-plan transactions.29
But it offered little additional guidance.30
This Article proposes that for pre-plan or “interim” settlements and distributions in chapter 11 that appear to circumvent
the Code’s safeguards of distributional priority, a proper solicitude
for the absolute priority rule is best achieved by market exposure.
This approach, when applied to a transaction with an insider or
other person who exerts control over the debtor, can be used to
achieve the remedial purposes of the absolute priority rule, which
are to preclude misallocations of estate value to those who exercise
control or who collude with them.31
A corollary of this rule involves recognizing that, to the extent that market exposure is unavailable, hypothetical valuations
are of little probative use in determining the propriety of a preplan distribution. This is especially true with respect to first-day
relief, pursuant to which a bankruptcy court may approve priorityskipping payments to some creditors because their continuing to
supply the debtor is considered essential to the debtor’s survival.32
The question of whether the non-essential creditors who do not
receive these payments are helped or disadvantaged by this dilution of the estate involves hypothetical valuations that are so
unreliable that a different, specialized rule should apply. I suggest
a rule that presumes the benefit of preserving the going concern
Id. at 985 (citing Motorola, Inc. v. Official Comm. of Unsec’d Creditors
(In re Iridium Operating LLC), 478 F.3d 452, 464 (2d Cir. 2007)).
28 Id.
29 Czyzewski, 137 S. Ct. at 986 (quoting Ind. St. Police Pens. Tr. v. Chrysler,
LLC (In re Chrysler LLC), 576 F.3d 108, 118 (2d Cir. 2009)).
30 Id. at 986–87.
31 See discussion infra Part II.
32 Czyzewski, 137 S. Ct. at 985 (recognizing that priority-skipping first-day
payments enable a successful reorganization); see also In re Just for Feet,
Inc., 242 B.R. 821, 824–25 (D.Del. 1999) (court may “authorize the payment
of pre-petition claims when such payment is deemed necessary to the survival
of a debtor in a chapter 11 reorganization”).
27
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value of a business and requires strict market exposure to determine whether an alternative supplier is available on the same or
better terms than those proposed by the assertedly essential
supplier who is insisting on the first-day payment.33
Part I of this Article considers the Jevic Court’s view of the
remedial purposes of the absolute priority rule, its skepticism of
hypothetical valuations used in support of chapter 11 distributions, and it declining—in large part because of that skepticism—to
extend the absolute priority rule to interim settlements and
first-day distributions.
Part II examines the temporal and substantive factors that
the Jevic Court used to distinguish a case-ending settlement—to
which the absolute priority rule applies—from an interim settlement, the rule for approval of which the Court left open. Part
II then proposes a market rather than a hypothetical valuation
of a challenged interim settlement or other transaction with an
insider or other person exercising control of the debtor, to achieve
the remedial purposes of the absolute priority rule, i.e., to preclude
the payment of a control premium to those who are asserted to be
exercising control over the debtor and those alleged to have colluded with them in achieving the settlement. This approach has
the additional benefit of advancing other purposes of bankruptcy
law emphasized by the Jevic Court, especially maximizing distributions to creditors and providing certainty of outcomes.34
An example of this approach involves a debtor that proposes
to settle the estate’s claim against an insider, by releasing the
insider in exchange for a settlement payment to the estate. The
question of whether the insider is receiving a control premium—
in the form of having to pay a lower settlement price than what
the claim is worth (thus also reducing eventual distributions to
other creditors)—is clearly at issue.35 The debtor’s claim against
the insider, though, can be marketed for outright sale to an arm’slength third-party buyer or to an investor who will fund the costs
of the litigation in return for a percentage of any recovery on the
See discussion infra Part III.
Czyzewski, 137 S. Ct. at 985–86 (citing Toibb v. Radloff, 111 S. Ct. 2197
(1991)).
35 Marc J. Carmel, If Jevic Is Your Problem, Litigation Finance Might Be
Your Solution, 36 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 1, 2–3 (2017).
33
34
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claim.36 A higher and better bid for the claim from a third-party
buyer or investor removes the issue of whether a control premium
is being paid to the insider—the costs and benefits of the transaction are now with the third party.37 If, on the other hand, the
settlement was vigorously marketed and no higher bid was obtained or the insider made the highest bid at the auction, a strong
case can be made that the insider’s bid reflects the highest and
best market price for the claim.38 The insider did not receive a
control premium in the form of a discount because if the claim was
worth more, a third party would have bid more.39
Part III considers the problem posed by hypothetical valuations, also stressed by the Jevic Court, with respect to first-day
relief and distributions. Part III suggests that a different rule
should apply for approval of distributions proposed to be made
pursuant to first-day orders, that are challenged as priorityskipping. I contend that any determination of whether such payments ultimately will benefit the other, disadvantaged, creditors
is so highly speculative as to be meaningless or nearly so in most
instances. Market exposure for first-day relief—though essential
to the bankruptcy court’s decision—will be limited to whether an
alternative can be obtained on better terms. A first-day distribution challenged as priority-skipping should be approved if the
debtor proves that it has sought in the market and failed to obtain an alternative to the good, service or credit proposed to be
supplied by the critical vendor, and that making the critical vendor
payment is necessary to preserve the debtor’s operations for the
sale of the business or a restructuring. The question of ultimate
benefit to other creditors should be presumed, rather than hypothetically determined. As the Jevic Court noted, preserving the
debtor’s business as a going concern is a Code-related objective in a
chapter 11 bankruptcy case, and is highly likely to benefit a debtor’s
employees, suppliers and even the creditors who are not paid on
the first day.40 A hypothetical valuation of ultimate distributions
Id. at 2–4.
Id.
38 Id. at 4.
39 Id.
40 Czyzewski, 137 S. Ct. at 985–86.
36
37
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to the creditors not paid on the first day is in most cases so unreliable that it adds little or nothing to the analysis.41
An example of this approach with respect to a first-day
motion follows. A vendor supplies the debtor with component parts
necessary for the debtor’s manufacturing operations, which the
debtor orders from the vendor by purchase order, on credit and
an as-needed basis. On the petition date, the debtor owes the vendor
on unpaid prepetition invoices. The vendor, who in this example
is under no obligation to continue to supply the component parts
to the debtor, refuses to do so unless the bankruptcy court approves the debtor’s paying the vendor 100 percent of its prepetition claim. The evidence at the first-day hearing is that the
debtor sought, and was unable to obtain, an immediate alternative supply of the component parts, and that without the parts
the debtor will need to shut down its operations. The market exposure in this example is limited to whether the debtor could obtain
an alternative supplier. But it is reasonable to presume that preserving the debtor’s operating business for sale or restructuring
will maximize the value of the debtor’s estate and benefit creditors more than shutting down operations and liquidating the
debtor’s assets piecemeal.42 This presumption, I suggest, is more
reliable than a hypothetical determination made at the first-day
hearing of the ultimate distributions that will be paid to creditors at the end of the case. Indeed, Congress enacted the reorganization provisions of U.S. bankruptcy law including chapter
11 based on this presumption.43
Id. This approach, more extensively discussed in Part III, essentially adopts
the “doctrine of necessity,” by emphasizing the debtor’s proving that it has
sought in the market and failed to obtain an alternative to the good, service, or
credit proposed to be supplied by the critical vendor. It rejects the Seventh
Circuit’s Kmart rule, because the hypothetical predictions that the latter rule
requires to be made in the first days of a chapter 11 case, of the ultimate distributions that will be made to different creditors on account of their claims at the
end of the case, are so speculative as to be meaningless in most cases.
42 See H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 220 (1977).
43 The reorganization provisions of chapters X, XI and XII of the Chandler
Act enacted in 1938 “embodie[d] the new social economic concept of reorganization and the rehabilitation of the debtor and his business as a going concern,
instead of the liquidation, distribution, and stoppage of business with the consequent loss to the debtor, creditors, employees, and the public generally.”
41
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I submit in conclusion that both interim settlements and
transactions with those who exercise control over a debtor, and
first-day distributions in chapter 11, should be approved on market
valuations and market-based evidence to the greatest extent
practicable, rather than hypothetical valuations. This approach,
I suggest, can in many cases address the issue of the misallocation of estate value based on control that gave rise to the absolute
priority rule and that concerned the Court when it considered
the structured dismissal in Jevic and the plan in 203 N. LaSalle.
This approach, as discussed in Part IV, also provides the
certainty sought by the Court in this area of bankruptcy law, in
a manner that encourages negotiation and settlement without
altering the parties’ rights under the Code.
I. THE JEVIC DECISION AND THE REACH OF THE ABSOLUTE
PRIORITY RULE UNDER THE BANKRUPTCY CODE
A. The Structured Dismissal in Jevic
The structured dismissal in Jevic was obtained following
negotiations over the two remaining major unresolved claims in
the case. The first—an action commenced on a derivative basis
by the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors against the
secured lenders, Sun Capital and CIT Group, seeking to avoid
alleged fraudulent transfers made in connection with Sun Capital’s prepetition leveraged buyout (LBO) of Jevic—was settled,
and the defendants were released, pursuant to the structured
dismissal. The second—a class action commenced by Jevic’s former truck-drivers against the debtor and Sun Capital for violation of state and federal WARN Acts, for Jevic’s alleged failure
Herman M. Knoeller, Reorganization Procedure Under the New Chandler Act,
24 MARQ. L. REV. 12, 14 (1939). Congress made the same presumption when it
passed the Bankruptcy Code in 1978. See H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 220 (1977)
(“The purpose of a business reorganization case, unlike a liquidation case, is to
restructure a business’s finances so that it may continue to operate, provide its
employees with jobs, pay its creditors, and produce a return for its stockholders. The premise of a business reorganization is that assets that are used for
production in the industry for which they were designed are more valuable
than those same assets sold for scrap .... It is more economically efficient to
reorganize than to liquidate, because it preserves jobs and assets.”).
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to provide proper notice of its closing and the termination of their
employment—was not settled.44
Negotiations originally included all these parties—the
debtor, the secured lenders, the Committee, the drivers, and the
holder of the equity in the debt.45 The debtor, the secured lenders, the Committee, and the debtor’s equity holders reached a
settlement.46 Under the settlement agreement: (1) the bankruptcy
court would dismiss, with prejudice, the estate’s fraudulent transfer
claim that the Committee had commenced against Sun Capital and
CIT; (2) CIT would pay $2.0 million to the estate, for payment of
administrative expenses including the Committee’s legal fees; (3)
Sun Capital would transfer to the estate its interest in the remaining $1.7 million of the proceeds from the liquidation of its
collateral; and (4) the court would dismiss Jevic’s chapter 11 case.47
The drivers, though, were not parties to the settlement.48
The reason was that the drivers and Sun Capital (which was both
a secured creditor and owned the equity interests in the debtor)
could not reach an agreement that provided for the dismissal of
the drivers’ WARN claims against Sun Capital. Without the drivers’ release, Sun Capital would not agree to a distribution to the
drivers of any of the $1.7 million that Sun Capital was contributing to the settlement because it did not want to help finance
litigation against itself.49
The bankruptcy court found that a chapter 11 plan could
not be confirmed in the case, and if the case was converted to
chapter 7, the chapter 7 trustee would have no funds with which
Czyzewski, 137 S. Ct. at 976. The Committee alleged that Sun Capital
and CIT had “hastened Jevic’s bankruptcy by saddling it with debts that it
couldn’t service.”
45 In re Jevic Holding Corp., 787 F.3d at 177.
46 Czyzewski, 137 S. Ct. at 981.
47 Id.
48 Id. The drivers, because they were not part of the settlement, retained
their claims against both the debtor and Sun Capital. Because the LBO claim
was the debtor’s only remaining asset, the settlement of that claim and the
distribution of the settlement proceeds to parties other than the drivers effectively deprived the drivers of any recovery on their WARN claim against the
debtor. The structured dismissal, though, did not affect the drivers’ WARN
claim against Sun Capital, which the drivers could continue to prosecute.
49 Id.
44
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to litigate the estate’s LBO claims against Sun Capital and CIT.50
Considering these “dire circumstances” facing the estate and its
creditors, the bankruptcy court approved the settlement. “[T]he
court predicted that without the settlement and dismissal, there
was ‘no realistic prospect’ of a meaningful distribution for anyone other than the secured creditors.”51
B. The Problem with the Structured Dismissal in Jevic
The problem with the structured dismissal in Jevic was that
the distribution of the $3.7 million of settlement proceeds paid
by the secured lenders to the estate for the release by the debtor
of its claims against them skipped over a group of priority unsecured creditors—the drivers who had brought claims against the
debtor under the WARN Act.52 The structured dismissal thus
arguably violated the absolute priority rule because the rule, if it
applied to a structured dismissal, required payment to the drivers prior to the payment made to the junior, non-priority general
unsecured creditors.53
Under the absolute priority rule, a senior creditor who has
distributional priority under the Code must be paid in full on
account of its claim, prior to any payment to a junior creditor or
equity.54 The rule, where it applies, requires the distribution of
estate assets to the following four tranches of debt and equity, in
descending order of seniority: (1) first, to each secured creditor,
up to the lesser of the amount of its claim or the value of its collateral;55 (2) next, to priority unsecured claims (which are listed
in section 507(a) of the Bankruptcy Code), in descending order of
priority; (3) then, to general, non-priority unsecured claims; and
(4) finally, to the holders of equity interests, such as shares or
membership interests, in the company.56 Under this rule, the
Id. at 981–82.
Id. at 982 (quoting App. to Pet. for Cert. 57a, 58a).
52 Id. at 981.
53 Id. at 980–82.
54 ABI Report, supra note 9, at 229–30.
55 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (2012) (providing that if the secured creditor’s claim
against the debtor exceeds the value of the secured creditor’s collateral, then
the amount by which the claim exceeds the collateral value is an unsecured
claim; such a creditor is commonly called “undersecured”).
56 ABI Report, supra note 9, at 229–30.
50
51
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creditors in the tranche at which the estate’s funds available for
distribution run out are paid pro rata, and all remaining creditors and equity holders who are junior in distributional priority
to that tranche receive nothing.57
If the absolute priority rule applied to the settlement,
then the drivers were entitled to payment on their priority unsecured WARN claims prior to any distribution to the non-priority
general unsecured claims proposed to be paid under the terms of
the settlement.58 But Sun Capital and the drivers could not reach
agreement on the payment to be made to the drivers in exchange
for their release, and Sun Capital was unwilling to fund litigation
against itself.59 So, the settlement required distributions to skip
over the WARN claims.60 The bankruptcy court approved the
priority-skipping distributions, reasoning that the absolute priority rule did not apply—because nothing in the Bankruptcy Code
expressly required application of the rule to a pre-plan settlement—
and the settlement maximized distributions to unsecured creditors.61 If it was not approved “there was ‘no realistic prospect’ of a
meaningful distribution for anyone other than the secured creditors.”62 The district court, and then the Third Circuit, affirmed.63
C. The Supreme Court’s Opinion in Jevic
The question before the Court in Jevic was whether a bankruptcy court has the legal power to order a “priority-skipping
kind of distribution scheme in connection with a chapter 11 dismissal.”64 The Court held that the bankruptcy court does not have
such power.65 Rather, a “distribution scheme ordered in connection with the dismissal of a chapter 11 case cannot, without the
Id. at 230.
Id. at 229–30.
59 Id.
60 Czyzewski, 137 S. Ct. at 981.
61 Id. at 981–82.
62 Id. at 982 (quoting App. to Pet. For Cert. 58a).
63 Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp. (In re Jevic Holding Corp.), 2014 WL
268613 (D. Del. 2014), aff’d, Official Comm. of Unsec’d Creditors ex rel. Jevic
Holding Corp. v. CIT Grp./Bus. Credit Inc. (In re Jevic Holding Corp.), 787
F.3d 173 (3d Cir. 2015).
64 Czyzewski, 137 S. Ct. at 978 (emphasis in original).
65 Id.
57
58
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consent of the affected parties, deviate from the basic priority
rules that apply under the primary mechanisms the Code establishes for final distributions of estate value in business bankruptcies.”66 That “primary mechanism,” in the Court’s view, is the
“absolute priority rule.”67
The Jevic Court, in disapproving the structured dismissal,
raised again the specters—which have haunted U.S. insolvency
proceedings since the railroad reorganizations of the late nineteenth century—of collusion among controlling secured creditors
and insiders such as managers and/or shareholders that misallocate estate value to those in on the deal on the basis of hypothetical valuations or contrived “sales” of estate assets.68 The
most common situation sought to be remedied by the absolute
priority rule was one in which the secured creditors, who were
senior because they were entitled to the value of their collateral,
entered into a reorganization plan with the railroad’s managers
and shareholders, who were not creditors at all and had the most
deeply subordinated stake in the railroad.69 Under that plan,
those parties—each of whom exercised a degree of control over the
enterprise—received all or most of the value of the reorganized
Id.
Id. at 983, 984.
68 See, e.g., Louisville Tr. Co. v. Louisville, New Albany & Chi. Ry. Co., 174
U.S. 674, 684 (1899) (In which the Supreme Court asked whether the mortgagor railroad and its mortgagee could enter into an agreement “by which[,]
through the form of equitable proceedings[,] all the right [of an] unsecured
creditor may be wiped out, and the interest of both mortgagor and mortgagee
in the property preserved and continued? The question carries its own answer.
Nothing of the kind can be tolerated.”). See also Kan. City Terminal Ry. Co. v.
Cent. Union Tr. Co. of N.Y., 271 U.S. 445, 455 (1926) (“Unsecured creditors of
insolvent corporations are entitled to the benefit of the values which remain
after lienholders are satisfied, whether this is present or prospective, for dividends or only for purposes of control.”); R.R. Co. v. Howard, 74 U.S. 392, 410
(1868). The early twentieth century case of N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Boyd, 228 U.S.
482 (1913), provides an example of the kind of contrived “sale” that concerned
the critics of the equity receiverships by which railroads were reorganized. The
railroad’s assets in Boyd were purchased on a going concern basis for $61 million
at a sale “where there was no competition,” even though the enterprise value
of the railroad was stated at $345 million in the reorganization agreement,
and the purchaser, a mere month after its purchase, issued $190 million of
new bonds and $155 million of stock on the property. Id. at 492, 508.
69 See Boyd, 228 U.S. at 492, 508; Knoeller, supra note 43, at 15–16.
66
67
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railroad, and the unsecured creditors in the middle, who were
powerless by comparison, received little or nothing.70 Such a
transaction entered into between senior stakeholders and insiders often resulted in a distribution to those in control that was
attributable to that control, and that deprived the creditors who
were in the middle and not in on the deal of their due.71
The rule at present extends to all tranches of debt and
equity.72 But the remedial purposes of the rule remain same.
The Jevic Court, quoting its last major decision on the rule, 203
N. LaSalle in 1999, emphasized that “the absolute priority rule
was developed in response to the ‘concern with the ability of a
few insiders, whether representatives of management or major
creditors, to use the reorganization process to gain an unfair advantage.’”73 The Court in 203 N. LaSalle was considering a
somewhat different aspect of the same problem—the “new value
corollary” or exception to the absolute priority rule.74 Under that
exception to the rule, a cramdown chapter 11 plan can be confirmed—even if a senior creditor objects because it is not being
paid in full—if the property distributed to the junior creditors or
equity holders under the plan is on account of their contribution
of “new capital in money or money’s worth, reasonably equivalent to the property’s value, and necessary for successful reorganization of the restructured enterprise.”75
Id.
11 U.S.C. §§ 726, 1129(b) (2012); Czyzewski, 137 S. Ct. at 987 (explaining
that the absolute priority rule addresses “risks of collusion, i.e., senior secured
creditors and general unsecured creditors teaming up to squeeze out priority
unsecured creditors.”); ABI Report, supra note 9, at 229–30.
72 11 U.S.C. §§ 726, 1129(b) (2012).
73 Czyzewski, 137 S. Ct. at 987 (quoting Bank of Am. Nat’l Tr. & Sav. Ass’n
v. 203 N. LaSalle St. P’ship, 526 U.S. 434, 444 (1999)).
74 203 N. LaSalle, 526 U.S. at 435.
75 Id. at 442. Justice Douglas in 1939, in Case v. L.A. Lumber Products Co.,
embedded the absolute priority rule into the corporate reorganization plan
confirmation provisions of the Bankruptcy Act that preceded the Code, when
he interpreted the textual requirement that a confirmable plan be “fair and
equitable” to require compliance with a rule of “full or absolute priority.” Case v.
L.A. Lumber Prods. Co., 308 U.S. 106, 114, 117 (1939). Douglas enunciated
the new value exception to the rule in the same case. Under the reorganization plan in L.A. Lumber, as in 203 N. LaSalle, the owners of the debtor were
receiving a control premium consisting of some of the shares in the new, reorganized debtor—for free—even though the creditors in the case were not being
70
71
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The owners of the debtor in 203 N. LaSalle had proposed
and obtained confirmation of a plan under which they—whose
interests were junior to those of creditors—would receive all of
the equity in the reorganized debtor, even though the creditors
were not being paid in full.76 The owners paid for their new equity under the plan by a contribution of capital to the reorganized debtor.77
The problem in 203 N. LaSalle, though, was that, under
the plan, only the existing equity holders in the old debtor were
given the opportunity to buy the equity in the new, reorganized
entity that would emerge from chapter 11.78 No one else was
given that opportunity, and the equity in the new, reorganized
debtor had not been exposed to the market for higher and better
bids.79 It was “the exclusiveness of the opportunity, with its protection against the market’s scrutiny of the purchase price by
paid in full under the plan. Douglas wrote, relying on equity receivership case
law for the rule: “It is, of course, clear that there are circumstances under
which stockholders may participate in a plan of reorganization of an insolvent
debtor.” Id. at 121. Douglas stressed “the necessity, at times, of seeking new
money ‘essential to the success of the undertaking’ from the old stockholders.
Where that necessity exists and the old stockholders make a fresh contribution
and receive in return a participation reasonably equivalent to their contribution, no objection can be made.” Id. at 122. A strange aspect of the 203 N. LaSalle
decision is the Court’s reluctance—sixty years later—to decide whether the
new value exception even exists under the Code, given that Congress said
nothing of it when it replaced the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 with the Code in
1978. Justice Souter, who wrote the 203 N. LaSalle opinion, spent much of that
opinion considering but never deciding the issue. 203 N. LaSalle, 526 U.S. at
444–49. In the end Souter wrote: “It is enough to say, assuming a new value
corollary, that plans providing junior interest holders with exclusive opportunities
free from competition and without benefit of market valuation fall within the
prohibition of § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii),” which sets forth the absolute priority that is
applicable to a chapter 11 cramdown plan. Id. at 458. Justice Stevens in dissent
wrote, “enough already” (to paraphrase generously), reasoning that the Court
had twice previously granted certiorari on the issue of whether the new value
exception to the absolute priority rule existed under the Code. Id. Justice
Stevens “believe[d] the Court should now definitively resolve the question and
state that a holder of a junior claim or interest does not receive property ‘on
account of’ such a claim”—and thus the rule is not violated—“when its participation in the plan is based on adequate new value.” Id. at 464.
76 See 203 N. LaSalle, 526 U.S. at 436.
77 See id. at 440.
78 See id.
79 See id. at 457.
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means of competing bids or even competing plan proposals,” that
lead the Court to conclude that the opportunity of old equity to
own the reorganized entity arose from and was “extended ‘on
account of’ the old equity position.”80 Because the owners of the
company had set aside for themselves the equity in the reorganized company, under a priority-skipping plan and supported
by a hypothetical valuation of that equity that lacked market
exposure, the Court reversed the bankruptcy court’s confirmation of the plan.81
While the Court in 203 N. LaSalle needed to consider
whether the new value exception could be found in the Code, the
Court in Jevic found it necessary to acknowledge that the absolute
priority rule has a somewhat limited reach under the express
provisions of the Code.82 The rule expressly applies to a liquidation under chapter 7.83 But “Chapter 11 plans provide somewhat
more flexibility.” Though the rule applies to a “cram-down” plan
in chapter 11 (i.e., a plan that one or more classes of creditors
has voted against) the rule does not apply to a consensual plan
which all impaired classes of creditors have voted to accept.84
The Court conceded, moreover, a “statutory silence” with respect
to whether the absolute priority rule applies to a non-consensual
chapter 11 structured dismissal, such as the one in Jevic.85
Id. at 456.
See id. at 458.
82 See Czyzewski, 137 S. Ct. at 987.
83 See 11 U.S.C. § 103(b) (2012) (limiting the absolute priority rule of § 726 to
chapter 7); § 726 (setting forth the absolute priority rule applicable in chapter 7).
84 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2) (2012) (setting forth the absolute priority rule applicable to a chapter 11 cramdown plan); §§ 1129(a)(8), (10)(b)(1) (limiting the
absolute priority rule of § 1129(b)(2) to a chapter 11 cramdown plan). Creditors vote on a chapter 11 plan by classes. A class of claims accepts, i.e., votes
in favor of a chapter 11 plan if more than one-half of the voting creditors in class,
who hold at least two-thirds of the dollar amount of the claims voted in that
class, have voted to accept the plan. § 1126(c). Thus, even a chapter 11 “consensual plan” does not require unanimity of creditors, because many creditors
within each accepting class may nonetheless have voted against confirmation
of the plan.
85 Czyzewski, 137 S. Ct. at 984. (The absolute priority rule is far from pervasive
or immutable under U.S. bankruptcy law.); see, e.g., John D. Ayer, Rethinking
Absolute Priority after Ahlers, 87 MICH. L. REV. 963, 974–76 (1989); Douglas
G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Control Rights, Priority Rights, and the
80
81
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The Court nonetheless extended the absolute priority rule
to the structured dismissal before it.86 It emphasized that the
“Code’s priority system constitutes a basic underpinning of business bankruptcy law” and “has long been considered fundamental to the Bankruptcy Code’s operation.”87 The Court would expect
that, “if Congress actually meant to make structured dismissals a
backdoor means” to achieve a non-consensual priority-skipping
final distribution, such as in Jevic, it would “see some affirmative indication of intent.”88
The Court expressed a number of concerns with the priorityskipping structured dismissal in Jevic, two of which were those
which gave rise to the absolute priority rule in U.S. bankruptcy
law.89 These concerns had also informed the Court in 203 N.
LaSalle, the last case before Jevic in which it considered the absolute priority rule.90 First, the settled claims against the secured
lenders, Sun Capital and CIT, which were estate assets, were not
exposed to the market and were instead valued hypothetically by
the bankruptcy court.91 The Court took issue with the validity of
that hypothetical valuation.92 Second, the parties on one side of the
settlement—the debtor’s secured parties and owners—exercised
Conceptual Foundations of Corporate Reorganizations, 87 VA. L. REV. 921,
928 (2001) (“The existing priority system is an uneasy compromise between
absolute and relative priority.”); James C. Bonbright & Milton M. Bergerman, Two Rival Theories of Priority Rights of Security Holders in a Corporate
Reorganization, 28 COLUM. L. REV. 127 (1928); David A. Skeel, Jr., The Empty Idea of “Equality of Creditors,” 166 U. PA. L. REV. 699 (2017) (“In current
practice, the most notable feature of the equality of creditors norm is how
easily a debtor can evade it. Although there may not be fifty ways to sidestep the
norm, the modes of escape are quite numerous,” citing PAUL SIMON, 50 WAYS
TO LEAVE YOUR LOVER (Columbia Records 1975)). Congress, moreover, has
consistently and materially circumscribed the rule since the Supreme Court’s
decision in L.A. Lumber. See Bruce Grohsgal, How Absolute is the Absolute Priority Rule in Bankruptcy? The Case for Structured Dismissals, 8 WM. & MARY.
BUS. L. REV. 439 (2017).
86 See Czyzewski, 137 S. Ct. at 983.
87 Id. at 983–84.
88 Id. at 984.
89 Id. at 980.
90 203 N. LaSalle, 526 U.S. at 434.
91 See Czyzewski, 137 S. Ct. at 980.
92 See id. at 983, 986.
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some control over the debtor.93 And the distributions under the
settlement skipped over the priority unsecured claims asserted
by the drivers to get to the more junior, non-priority general unsecured creditors represented by the creditors committee that was
on the other side of the settlement.94 Affirming the bankruptcy
court’s approval of the settlement thus would increase the “risks of
collusion, i.e., senior secured creditors and general unsecured creditors teaming up to squeeze out priority unsecured creditors.”95
The Court then considered whether there should be a rare
case exception to the rule.96 The bankruptcy court in Jevic had
found that without the priority-skipping distribution, there
would be no settlement, and without the settlement, the debtor’s
claim would have no value.97 Faced with “a meaningful return or
zero,” the bankruptcy court held that the paramount interest of
the creditors mandated its approval of the settlement and nothing
in the Code dictated otherwise.98
The Third Circuit embraced the bankruptcy court’s reasoning and affirmed, holding that the bankruptcy court could
approve a settlement that deviated from absolute distributional
priorities in the rare case in which there are “specific and credible
grounds” to justify the deviation, citing the Second Circuit’s decision in Iridium.99 In the Third Circuit’s view, the bankruptcy court
in Jevic, “in Solomonic fashion,” had “reluctantly approved the only
course that resulted in some payment” to unsecured creditors.100
The Supreme Court, in reversing, expressly rejected this
“rare case” exception to a case-ending, priority-skipping settlement
that lacked the consent of all parties.101 The Court emphasized
again that the hypothetical basis on which the bankruptcy court
Id. at 978.
See id. at 978.
95 Id. at 987.
96 See Czyzewski, 137 S. Ct. at 986.
97 See id. at 976.
98 Official Comm. of Unsec’d Creditors ex rel. Jevic Holding Corp. v. CIT
Grp./Bus. Credit Inc. (In re Jevic Holding Corp.), 787 F.3d 173, 178–79 (3d
Cir. 2015).
99 Id. at 183–84 (citing Motorola, Inc. v. Official Comm. of Unsec’d Creditors
(In re Iridium Operating LLC), 478 F.3d 452, 466 (2d Cir. 2007)).
100 Id. at 185.
101 Czyzewski, 137 S. Ct. at 986.
93
94
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had made its “reasonable return or zero” finding had only “equivocal
support” in the record, leading the Court to “readily imagine
other cases that turn on comparably dubious predictions.”102 The
Court also stressed that a rare case exception would depart from
the protections given by Congress to different kinds of creditors
in the form of distributional priorities, would alter the bargaining power that arises from those priorities, would increase uncertainty of outcomes and risks of collusion, and in the end would
make settlements more difficult to achieve.103
D. Circuit Splits Left Unresolved by Jevic—To What Extent Does
the Absolute Priority Rule Apply to Interim Settlements or
“First-Day” Distributions in Chapter 11?
The Jevic Court limited its ruling to a priority-skipping
structured dismissal with respect to which the skipped over creditors had not consented.104 It also cited with approval a bankruptcy
court’s approval of a priority-skipping structured dismissal that
the skipped-over creditors had tacitly approved by their declining
to object.105 It “express[ed] no view about the legality of structured
dismissals in general.”106
The Court viewed interim settlements in chapter 11 that
are not case-ending differently.107 The Court, though, did not resolve the circuit split on this issue between the Fifth Circuit’s
AWECO holding that extended the absolute priority rule to all
pre-plan settlements and the longstanding TMT Trailer rule,
followed by most circuits, that does not require adherence to the
rule for interim settlements.108
The Court also did not resolve the rule for approving priorityskipping “first-day wage orders,” “critical vendor” payments, and
“roll-ups” that allow a prepetition secured lender who provides
Id.
Id. at 986–87.
104 See id. at 983.
105 Id. (citing In re Buffet Partners, L.P., No. 14-30699-HDH-11, 2014 WL
3735804 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2014)).
106 Id. at 985.
107 See id. at 983, 985.
108 Compare United States v. AWECO, Inc. (In re AWECO, Inc.), 725 F.2d
293, 298 (5th Cir. 1984), with Protective Comm. for Indep. Stockholders of TMT
Trailer Ferry, Inc. v. Anderson, 390 U.S. 414, 441 (1968).
102
103
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new financing after the chapter 11 commences to be paid first on
its prepetition claim.109 The Court emphasized that “one can
generally find significant Code-related objectives that the priorityviolating distributions serve.”110 But it did not resolve the circuit
split on this issue, between the “doctrine of necessity,” under
which a court pursuant to a first-day order can authorize a priority-skipping payment of a claim to a creditor who will not supply services or material essential to the continued operation of
the debtor’s business, and the Seventh Circuit’s Kmart rule, which
requires proof that the first-day payment proposed to be made to
the advantaged creditor will result, eventually, in the same or
higher distributions to the disadvantaged creditors.111
The circuit split on interim settlements is further considered in Part II below, in the context of a proposed use of market
exposure rather than a mechanical application of the absolute
priority rule, to preclude misallocations of estate value to insiders
and other parties who have control over the debtor. The circuit
split on first-day relief is further considered in Part III below, in
the context of the court’s inability to obtain full market exposure
of proposed first-day distributions and the unreliability of the
hypothetical valuations required by Kmart to be made at the
first-day hearing in a chapter 11 case, of the distributions that
will be made at the end of the case.
II. INTERIM SETTLEMENTS DISTINGUISHED FROM CASE-ENDING
TRANSACTIONS UNDER JEVIC AND MARKET EXPOSURE FOR
CHALLENGED INTERIM SETTLEMENTS POST-JEVIC
Parties settle numerous claims and disputes over the course
of a chapter 11 bankruptcy case. The Supreme Court in Jevic
recognized the difficulty of applying the absolute priority rule to
an interim settlement, made prior to the end of the case, because
“the nature and extent of the Estate, and the claims against it are
not yet fully resolved.”112 The Court held though, that a case-ending
109 Czyzewski,

137 S. Ct. at 985.
Id.
111 Compare In re Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 467 F.2d 100, 102 n.1 (3d Cir. 1972)
(doctrine of necessity), with In re Kmart Corp., 359 F.3d 866, 872 (7th Cir. 2004).
112 Czyzewski, 137 S. Ct. at 985 (quoting Motorola, Inc. v. Official Comm. of
Unsec’d Creditors (In re Iridium Operating LLC), 478 F.3d 452, 464 (2d Cir. 2007)).
110
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settlement—that makes “end-of-case distributions of estate assets to creditors of the kind that normally take place in a chapter 7
liquidation or chapter 11 plan” and to which some affected creditors object—must comply with the absolute priority rule.113
The Court did not define what kind of a settlement, other
than a structured dismissal, it considered to be case-ending.114
Nor did it state a rule for a bankruptcy court’s approving an
interim settlement or resolve the circuit split on that issue.115
This Part suggests, first, that the Court recognized in its
Jevic opinion that there are both temporal and substantive aspects to the question of whether a settlement and the distributions
under it are interim rather than end-of-case. Second, this Section
proposes that, for an interim settlement that is challenged as
priority-skipping and/or case-ending, the estate claims and other
assets that are included in the proposed settlement can, in many
cases, be exposed to the market in a manner that deprives controlling and colluding parties of any premium, thus addressing the
problem sought to be remedied by the absolute priority rule.
A. What Is an Interim as Opposed to an End-of-Case Settlement
and Distribution?
The Jevic Court did not define what makes a settlement
interim, to which the absolute priority rule does not apply, as
opposed to case-ending, such as the structured dismissal in Jevic
to which the rule does apply.116 The Court suggested, though, two
factors: one temporal and the other substantive.117
1. The Temporal Component and the Circuit Split on the
Extension of the Absolute Priority Rule to Interim
Settlements
Temporally, a settlement approved contemporaneously with
the dismissal of the case, as in Jevic, clearly is case-ending.118 At
Id. at 984.
See id. at 985.
115 See id.
116 See id. at 985–86.
117 See id. at 985.
118 Czyzewski, 137 S. Ct. at 985–86.
113
114

86 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10:061
what time though, in the vast temporal middle of a typical chapter
11 bankruptcy case, might a proposed settlement be found caseending and thus trigger compliance with the absolute priority
rule under Jevic?119 If the court approves the settlement prior to
the debtor’s filing a motion to dismiss the case, for example, and
the debtor moves for dismissal on the next day, or the next
week, or the next month, or even the next year, is the settlement
case-ending?
The Court did not elaborate on how near in time a settlement must be to the expected closing of the bankruptcy case for
it to be potentially case-ending.120 But a definition of “end-ofcase” based solely on the temporal proximity of the settlement to
the closing of the case would in many cases elevate form over
substance, encourage parties to game the rule, and accomplish
little by way of preventing control premiums and asserted misallocations of estate value based on control and collusion.121
The Court could have resolved the temporal problem of
what is case-ending by adopting a per se rule.122 Under a per se
rule, any interim settlement outside of a plan, reached at any
time in the chapter 11 case, must comply with the absolute priority rule.123
One circuit court, the Fifth Circuit in In re AWECO, Inc.,
had so held.124 The Court in Jevic did not.125 While it applied the
absolute priority rule to an end-of-case settlement, it expressly
declined to extend the rule’s reach to an interim settlement, or
to resolve the circuit split on this issue.126
See id. at 985–87.
Id. at 987.
121 Id. at 977.
122 Id. (explaining how the Court did not adopt a bright line rule to determine
when a settlement is case-ending).
123 See id.
124 See In re AWECO, Inc., 725 F.2d at 293, 298.
125 See Czyzewski, 137 S. Ct. at 977.
126 See id. at 985–86; see also 11 U.S.C. § 363(b) (2012) (The Bankruptcy
Code and Rules are silent on the issue of whether the absolute priority rule
applies to an interim settlement. Code section 363(b) authorizes the debtor’s sale
or use of estate property “out of the ordinary course of business,” such as in a
settlement, so long as the bankruptcy court approves.). Settlements outside of
a plan are authorized pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 9019. That Rule provides
119
120
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It might have been otherwise. The question originally presented to the Court in Jevic, on which it granted certiorari, was:
“[w]hether a bankruptcy court may authorize the distribution of
settlement proceeds in a manner that violates the statutory priority scheme.”127 The petitioners had argued in their application
for certiorari that the Third Circuit’s decision in Jevic “‘deepened an
existing ... split among the Courts of Appeals on this question.”128
On one side of this split was the Fifth Circuit’s decision
establishing the per se rule in AWECO.129 Under AWECO, a proposed settlement or other use of estate property must comply
with the absolute priority rule from the first day of the chapter
11 case.130 The court observed that the terms “fair and equitable,”
which apply to confirmation of a chapter 11 cramdown plan, are
“terms of art—they mean that ‘senior interests are entitled to
full priority over junior ones.’”131 It held that the rule arises “as
that, “after notice and a hearing, the court may approve a compromise or settlement.” FED. R. BANKR. P. 9019(a). Neither Code section 363 nor Rule 9019
refer to distributional priorities or the absolute priority. Since the Code became effective in 1978, most lower courts have applied variations of the riskbenefit standard set forth in the Supreme Court’s decision in TMT Trailer (a
chapter X corporate reorganization case under the Bankruptcy Act) to decide
whether to approve a chapter 11 settlement. TMT Trailer does not require a
pre-plan settlement to adhere to the absolute priority rule. TMT Trailer, 390
U.S. at 414, 418. Rather, a court considering a proposed pre-plan settlement
must consider the potential benefits and risks of the debtor’s continuing to
litigate, as compared with what the debtor gains and gives up by the settlement. Specifically, the court must evaluate the probability that the debtor will
succeed in the litigation, the difficulties that the debtor might have in collecting
a judgment, the complexity of the litigation, the expense, inconvenience and
delay in pursuing it, and the interests of creditors and their reasonable views
regarding whether the settlement is advisable. 10 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶
9019.02 (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed. 2009).
127 See Czyzewski, 137 S. Ct. at 987 (Thomas, J., joined by Alito, J. dissenting).
128 Id.
129 See In re AWECO, Inc., 725 F.2d at 298.
130 See id.
131 Id. (quoting SEC v. Am. Trailer Rentals Co., 379 U.S. 594 (1965) (Act
case)). The AWECO court extended to a pre-plan settlement the meaning of “fair
and equitable” that applies to a chapter 11 cramdown plan—i.e., a plan which
some impaired classes voted to accept and some voted to reject, and to which
the absolute priority rule applies. Section 1129(b)(1) requires a cramdown plan to
be “fair and equitable” for the bankruptcy court to confirm it. Section 1129(b)(2)
provides that, for such purpose, “the condition that a plan be fair and equitable”
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soon as a debtor files a petition for relief,” and “does not suddenly
appear during the process of approv[al] a plan of compromise.”132
Moreover, if the standard had no application before confirmation
of a reorganization plan, then bankruptcy courts would have the
discretion to favor junior classes of creditors so long as the approval of the settlement came before the plan.”133 The AWECO
court’s understanding of “bankruptcy law’s underlying policies”
led it to extend the rule, and it held that “a bankruptcy court abuses
its discretion in approving a settlement with a junior creditor unless
the court concludes that priority of payment will be respected as
to objecting senior creditors.”134
On the other side of the split was the Second Circuit’s decision in Iridium and the Third Circuit’s decision in Jevic.135 The
Iridium court emphasized the need for flexibility in pre-plan settlements, while conceding that such flexibility “has its costs.”136 It
held that if a party (the unsecured creditors’ committee in that
case) “reaches a settlement that in some way impairs the rule of
priorities, it must come before the bankruptcy court with specific
and credible grounds to justify the deviation and the court must
carefully articulate its reasons for approval of the agreement.”137
The Third Circuit in Jevic agreed with the Second Circuit’s standard for approval of an interim settlement in chapter
11, and rejected the Fifth Circuit’s per se application of the absolute priority rule to all interim settlements.138 The Third Circuit
emphasized its view that the Code and the Bankruptcy Rules
“leave bankruptcy courts more flexibility in approving settlements
than in confirming plans of reorganization.”139 Conceding that it
includes the distributional requirements of the absolute priority rule. 11 U.S.C.
§§ 1129(b)(1)–(2) (2012).
132 In re AWECO, Inc., 725 F.2d at 298.
133 Id.
134 Id.
135 Motorola, Inc. v. Official Comm. of Unsec’d Creditors (In re Iridium Operating LLC), 478 F.3d 452, x (2d Cir. 2007); Official Comm. of Unsec’d Creditors
ex rel. Jevic Holding Corp. v. CIT Grp./Bus. Credit Inc. (In re Jevic Holding Corp.),
787 F.3d 173, x (3d Cir. 2003).
136 In re Iridium Operating LLC, 478 F.3d at 452, 466.
137 Id.
138 In re Jevic Holding Corp., 787 F.3d at 173, 184.
139 Id.
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was “a close call,” the court concluded that the bankruptcy court
had sufficient reason to approve the settlement and structured
dismissal of Jevic’s chapter 11 case, even though it was priorityskipping, because doing so was the “least bad alternative.”140
The Supreme Court in Jevic might have resolved this issue,
but it did not.141 In one of the more peculiar procedural paths taken
in the Court’s history, the petitioners—after the Court granted
certiorari—recast the question presented to ask instead: “[w]hether
a Chapter 11 case may be terminated by a ‘structured dismissal’
that distributes estate property in violation of the Bankruptcy
Code’s priority scheme.”142
Both the original question and the reformulated question
stated by the appellants involved priority-skipping.143 But, as
Justice Thomas protested in his dissent, “the recast question” was
“narrower—and different”—than the one on which the Court had
“granted certiorari.”144 It was “also not the subject of a circuit conflict.”145 The majority opinion in the Jevic opinion did not so
much as mention the circuit split or AWECO or its per se rule.146
In any event, the Court declined to draw the bright temporal line that it might have, had it decided either that the rule
of distributional priorities arises on the filing of the bankruptcy
petition and thus applies to all interim or other pre-plan settlements and transactions or that it does not apply to those settlements and transactions at all.147 The facts instead hit the prism
of the reformulated question that limited the Court’s holding to
Id. at 184–85.
Id. at 987.
142 Id.
143 See id. at 978.
144 Id. at 987–88.
145 Id. The split was not quite as sharp as stated because the Fifth Circuit
itself was not completely consistent in following In re AWECO, Inc. See, e.g.,
Sandoz v. Bennett (In re Emerald Oil Co.), 807 F.2d 1234, 1239 (5th Cir.
1987) (affirming settlement with no mention of whether it complied with the
absolute priority rule); Texas Extrusion Corp. v. Lockheed Corp. (In re Texas
Extrusion Corp.), 844 F.2d 1142, 1158–59 (5th Cir. 1988) (affirming settlement contained in plan because it was not an “abuse of discretion” without
mention of whether the settlement complied with the absolute priority rule),
aff’g 68 B.R. 712 (N.D. Tex. 1986).
146 See Czyzewski, 137 S. Ct. at 977–87.
147 See id.
140
141
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an end-of-case structured dismissal.148 Yet the Court cast some
light on another, substantive aspect of whether an interim settlement or transaction should be considered case-ending and thus
require compliance with the absolute priority rule.149 This aspect
of the question is discussed below.
2. The Substantive Component—Settlements Lacking
Market Exposure That Predetermine Final Distributions
to Creditors
A proposed settlement or other transaction may be substantively case-ending, even though it is temporally interim, if
the proposed transaction predetermines final distributions to
creditors or equity holders absent a process that enables a court
to determine that the transaction shows a proper solicitude for
the absolute priority rule.150
I suggest in this Section that the procedural safeguards
identified by the Court in its recent jurisprudence—specifically
Jevic in 2017 and 203 N. LaSalle in 1999—are procedures that
expose the estate assets at issue to the market rather than those
for confirmation of a chapter 11 plan.151 The starting point is the
Jevic Court’s contrasting characterization of the pre-plan transactions in Braniff and Chrysler.152
The Jevic Court analogized to—and cited with disfavor—
the proposed settlement and sale transaction in In re Braniff
Airways, Inc. among the debtor and certain of its secured and
unsecured creditors.153 It characterized the Braniff transaction
as “an attempt to ‘short circuit the requirements of Chapter 11
for confirmation of a reorganization plan by establishing the
terms of the plan sub rosa in connection with a sale of assets.’”154
The Court, citing Braniff, stressed that the structured dismissal
resembled “proposed transactions that lower courts have refused
Id. at 983.
Id. at 983–87.
150 See id. at 978.
151 These procedures are similar to those by which operating business enterprises commonly are sold in bankruptcy proceedings, pursuant to section
363(b) of the Code, and prior to a chapter 11 plan. 11 U.S.C. § 363(b).
152 Czyzewski, 137 S. Ct. at 977–87.
153 Id. at 978.
154 Id. (quoting In re Braniff Airways, Inc., 700 F.2d 935, 940 (5th Cir. 1989).
148
149
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to allow on the ground that they circumvent the Code’s procedural safeguards.”155
Yet, the Jevic Court regarded Chrysler differently, though
it too was a pre-plan sale case.156 The Court quoted favorably the
Second Circuit’s determination that the bankruptcy court that
approved the Chrysler sale had “demonstrated ‘proper solicitude
for the priority between creditors and deemed it essential that
the [s]ale in no way upset that priority.’”157
The Jevic Court framed the issue in terms of whether a
proposed interim settlement or other pre-plan transaction satisfies
the “Code’s procedural safeguards.”158 But the issue was hardly
procedural. The debtor in each of Braniff and Chrysler had equally
circumvented the procedures for plan confirmation that safeguard
creditors and other parties in interest in chapter 11.159 Those procedures include filing a chapter 11 disclosure statement and plan;
giving creditors and other parties notice and an opportunity to object to court approval of the disclosure statement and confirmation
of the plan; obtaining court approval of the disclosure statement on
a finding that it contains adequate information about the plan;
transmitting the court-approved disclosure statement to the parties
Id.
Id.
157 Czyzewski, 137 S. Ct. at 978 (quoting Ind. St. Police Pens. Tr. v. Chrysler,
LLC (In re Chrysler LLC), 576 F.3d 108, 118 (2d Cir. 2009)).
158 Id. at 986.
159 Structured dismissals and pre-plan sales both have been criticized as a
means by which debtors and creditors can evade the statutory procedures required
for confirmation of a chapter 11 plan. See Nan Roberts Eital et al., Structured
Dismissals, or Cases Dismissed Outside of Code’s Structure?, 30 AM. BANKR. INST.
J. 20, 20 (2011) (“Structured chapter 11 dismissals ignore important chapter 11
safeguards that structured dismissals omit, including voting, acceptance, disclosure and the ‘fair and equitable’ standards, including the absolute-priority rule.”);
Jonathan C. Lipson, The Secret Life of Priority: Corporate Reorganization After
Jevic, 90 WASH. L. REV. 631, 634 (2018) (emphasizing disclosure and voting as the
two key participatory features of the chapter 11 plan process); Mark J. Roe &
David Skeel, Assessing the Chrysler Bankruptcy, 108 MICH. L. REV. 728, 735–36
(2010) (Terms of a pre-plan bankruptcy sale “determine core aspects that would
normally be handled under § 1129, with disclosure, voting under § 1129(a)(8),
and if voting fails, via a judicial cramdown under § 1129(b),” which requires
compliance with the absolute priority rule. “If the restructuring is done via
§ 363, courts need to resolve how to reconcile such sales with § 1129. ... But
fast sales with some priority determinations can be reconciled. The court can
identify the offending feature of the § 363 sale and ascertain whether it’s small
and whether priority determination would have passed muster under § 1129.”).
155
156
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entitled to vote on the plan; soliciting the vote and acceptance of
the plan by one or more impaired classes of creditors who are entitled to vote and, in some cases, from the holders of equity; and
obtaining the bankruptcy court’s confirmation of the plan following a confirmation hearing at which the bankruptcy judge considers the vote, hears the objections, and then determines whether
the plan has met all of the requirements for confirmation.160
Put bluntly, the debtor in Braniff and Chrysler equally
flaunted the procedural safeguards of chapter 11.161 The debtor
in neither Braniff nor Chrysler had proposed a chapter 11 plan at
the time it sought the bankruptcy court approval of the sale.162
Each debtor instead sought court approval of a sale, upon consummation of which the company would have new owners and
new, restructured debt, and would for practical purposes have
reorganized without following any of the procedures required for
confirmation of a chapter 11 plan.163
Why then did the Jevic Court suggest that the Braniff sale
had circumvented—while the Chrysler sale had satisfied—“the
Code’s procedural safeguards?”164 Stated another way, what are
the required “procedural safeguards” for approval of an interim
settlement or other pre-plan transaction in a chapter 11 bankruptcy case?
The Fifth Circuit in Braniff, in reversing the lower court’s approval of the
section 363(b) sale in that case, admonished: “In any future attempts to specify
the terms whereby a reorganization plan is to be adopted, the parties and the
district court must scale the hurdles erected in Chapter 11. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C.
§ 1125 (disclosure requirements); § 1126 (voting); § 1129(a)(7) (best interest of creditors test); § 1129(b)(2)(B) (absolute priority rule).” In re Braniff Airways, Inc.,
700 F.2d 935, 940 (1989).
161 Ind. St. Police Pens. Tr. v. Chrysler, LLC (In re Chrysler LLC), 576 F.3d
108, 127 (2d Cir. 2009); In re Braniff, 700 F.2d at 939–40.
162 In re Chrysler LLC, 576 F.3d at 127; In re Braniff, 700 F.2d at 939–40.
The Chrysler sale, moreover, was consummated at lightning speed—forty-one
days from the bankruptcy filing. Chrysler filed its chapter 11 petition on
April 30, 2009, the date on which the debtor entered into a Master Transaction
Agreement for the sale of its business and substantially all of its assets to a new
entity, New Chrysler, in which the major investor was Fiat S.p.A. The court approved bidding procedures on May 5. No other bids for the business or assets
were obtained. The court held hearings from May 27 to May 29 on whether to approve the proposed sale and the bankruptcy court approved the sale on June 1.
The sale closed on June 10. In re Chrysler LLC, 576 F.3d at 111–12, 118.
163 In re Chrysler LLC, 576 F.3d at 111–12; In re Braniff, 700 F.2d at 938,
939–40.
164 Czyzewski, 137 S. Ct. at 986 (citing In re Braniff, 700 F.2d at 940).
160
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I suggest that the answer depends, first, on whether a
market exposure of the debtor’s assets involved in the proposed
transaction resulted in a reliable determination of the value of those
assets. That determination, second, can provide the clarity required
for the bankruptcy court to determine whether the distributions
to be made pursuant to the transaction substantively distribute
value in accordance with the Code’s distributional priorities or
misallocate estate value to parties who exercise control over the
debtor or have colluded with them. Support for this conclusion can
be inferred from Braniff, 203 N. LaSalle, and Chrysler, and the
Supreme Court’s 1999 decision in 203 N. LaSalle.165
The interim settlement and sale in Braniff is the iconic
improper sub rosa plan transaction under the Code.166 Neither the
debtor’s claims proposed to be settled (by cross-releases among
the settling parties) nor the debtor’s assets proposed to be sold
had been exposed to the market.167 No chapter 11 plan had been
filed and the parties provided no evidence that the distributions
to be made pursuant to the transaction complied with the priorities for a plan.168
Under the proposed settlement in Braniff, the debtor would
sell and transfer the slots and its terminal leases, cash, airplanes
and equipment to the new operator in return for “travel script,
unsecured notes, and a profit participation[.]”169 The travel script
entitled the holder to travel on the new airline and “[could] be used
only in a future ... reorganization.”170 The script would be issued
165 See generally Czyzewski, 137 S. Ct.; In re Chrysler LLC, 576 F.3d; 203
N. LaSalle, 526 U.S.; In re Braniff, 700 F.2d.
166 See In re Braniff, 700 F.2d at 937–41.
167 Id.
168 Id. at 938. The Braniff settlement and sale transaction arose after the
Federal Aviation Administration allocated the debtor’s landing slots to other carriers. The unsecured creditors committee asserted that the slots were property
of the estate and sought a declaration that the allocation constituted a violation of
the automatic stay and of a temporary restraining order previously entered in
the case. (The automatic stay prohibits “any act to obtain possession of property
of the estate or of property from the estate or to exercise control over property
of the estate” without court approval. 11 U.S.C. §§ 362(a)(3), (d) (2012)). The
parties resolved the committee’s motion by the FAA’s agreeing to return the
slots to the debtor if the debtor or its successor recommenced operations. The
debtor and certain secured and unsecured creditors then entered into the
proposed settlement of claims and potential litigation.
169 In re Braniff, 700 F.2d at 939.
170 Id.
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only to the debtor’s former employees, shareholders, and unsecured creditors, without any regard to the distributional priorities of
their respective claims.171 The Fifth Circuit found that the transaction “had the practical effect of dictating some of the terms of any
future reorganization plan,” including because any “reorganization
plan would have to allocate the scrip according to the terms of the
PSA agreement or forfeit a valuable asset.”172 Any future attempt to
specify the terms of a chapter 11 plan, it admonished, “would have
to scale the hurdles erected in Chapter 11,” including the absolute
priority rule.173 The Jevic Court described the transaction that the
Fifth Circuit disapproved in Braniff as one that would have “circumvent[ed] the Code’s procedural safeguards.”174
Chrysler, by comparison, found favor in the eyes of the Jevic
Court, for the bankruptcy court’s having demonstrated proper
solicitude for distributional priorities.175 First and foremost, the
assets involved in the pre-plan transaction had been exposed to
the market.176 The Second Circuit, in affirming the bankruptcy
court, emphasized that court’s findings that the debtor had made
“prolonged and well-publicized efforts to find a strategic partner
or buyer.”177 Its executives had “circled the globe in search of a
deal.”178 “Notwithstanding ... highly publicized and extensive
efforts [made over] two years ... the Fiat transaction [was] the
only option that [was] currently viable. The only other alternative was the immediate liquidation of the company.”179
The second lien lenders in Chrysler challenged the distributions of the sale proceeds as priority-skipping.180 The market exposure of the assets gave the bankruptcy court a firm ground upon
which to conclude that the Code’s distributional priorities were
being respected.181 Specifically, the bankruptcy court found that
the sale would yield $2 billion of sale proceeds, all of which would
Id.
Id.
173 Id. at 940.
174 Czyzewski, 137 S. Ct. at 986.
175 In re Chrysler LLC, 576 F.3d at 117–18.
176 Id. at 118.
177 Id.
178 Id.
179 Id. (citing In re Chrysler LLC, 405 B.R. 94, 96 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009)).
180 In re Chrysler LLC, 576 F.3d at 118.
181 Id.
171
172
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be paid to the first lien lenders, whose secured claims clearly exceeded that amount.182 The objecting junior, second lien lenders,
equally clearly, were out of the money.183
Moreover, the market sale of the Chrysler assets formed the
basis for the bankruptcy court’s approval of distributions that were
challenged as priority-skipping.184 Specifically, the terms of the
sale required that the equity in the reorganized Chrysler would be
issued to unsecured creditors, skipping over the second lien lenders.185 The bankruptcy court, having determined that “all the equity
stakes in New Chrysler were entirely attributable to new value”
(including government loans), approved the issuance of new equity
to unsecured creditors, skipping over the second lien lenders.186
The problem with using hypothetical valuations (as in
Braniff) rather than market valuations (as in Chrysler) to determine
compliance with distributional priorities was at the heart of the
Court’s 1999 decision in 203 N. LaSalle, just as it was in Jevic in
2017.187 The issue in 203 N. LaSalle was the debtor’s proposal to
make priority-skipping distributions of equity in the reorganized
debtor to those in control of the debtor, without exposing the new
equity to the market.188 Specifically, the plan in 203 N. LaSalle
was challenged as priority-skipping because it left a large unsecured claim (the bank’s deficiency claim) unpaid even though a
junior interest, the owners of equity in the debtor, would receive
a distribution in the form of the equity in the new, reorganized
debtor.189 The market exposure problem was that only those existing equity holders were given the opportunity to buy the equity in
the new, reorganized debtor. The “exclusiveness of the opportunity,
with its protection against the market’s scrutiny of the purchase
price by means of competing bids or even competing plan proposals”
Id. at 117, n.9.
Id.
184 Id. at 118. The “Indiana Pensioners” challenged the Chrysler sale as “a
sub rosa plan chiefly because it [gave] value to unsecured creditors (i.e., in the
form of the ownership interest in New Chrysler provided to the union benefit
funds) without paying off secured debt in full, and without complying with the
procedural requirements of Chapter 11.”
185 In re Chrysler LLC, 576 F.3d at 118.
186 Id.
187 See generally Czyzewski, 137 S. Ct. at 973; 203 N. LaSalle, 526 U.S. at 434.
188 203 N. LaSalle, 526 U.S. at 439–44.
189 Id.
182
183

96 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10:061
led the Court to conclude that the right to purchase the new equity
arose from and was “extended ‘on account of’ the old equity position.”190 Because the owners of the company had set aside for
themselves the new equity in the reorganized company, under a
priority-skipping plan supported by a hypothetical valuation of the
new equity that lacked market exposure, the Court reversed the
bankruptcy court’s conversion of the plan.191
The “proper solicitude for the priority between creditors”192
shown in Chrysler, but lacking in the Jevic and Braniff transactions and in the 203 N. LaSalle plan, appears to have been demonstrated by the exposure to the market of the assets implicated in
the challenged transaction.193 That market exposure in Chrysler
enabled a court to make an informed determination regarding
whether estate value had been distributed in accordance with the
absolute priority rule or had been misallocated in violation of it.194
Market exposure also formed the basis for the bankruptcy court’s
approval of apparent priority-skipping in Chrysler, in the form of
the distribution to unsecured over the second lien secured creditors, because the market exposure showed that the distribution to
the unsecured creditors was attributable to new value by a contribution or “gift” made by a third party rather than on account
of the unsecured creditors’ claims.195 No such market exposure
occurred in Jevic,196 Braniff,197 or 203 N. LaSalle.198
The Supreme Court emphasized this problem in both Jevic
and 203 N. LaSalle: in Jevic when it took issue with what it
characterized as the bankruptcy court’s “dubious predictions” of
distributional outcomes that would follow from the settlement or
the absence of it,199 and in 203 N. LaSalle when it wrote that the
exclusiveness of the opportunity to purchase the equity in the new
debtor precluded competing bids and thus shielded the transaction
Id. at 456.
Id. at 458.
192 Czyzewski, 137 S. Ct. at 986 (quoting In re Chrysler LLC, 576 F.3d at 118).
193 Id. at 981; In re Chrysler LLC, F.3d at 118; 203 N. LaSalle, 526 U.S. at
440, 456; In re Braniff, 700 F.2d at 940–41.
194 In re Chrysler LLC, 576 F.3d at 118.
195 Id. at 119.
196 Czyzewski, 137 S. Ct. at 978, 981.
197 In re Braniff, 700 F.2d at 940–41.
198 203 N. Lasalle, 526 U.S. at 440, 456.
199 Czyzewski, 137 S. Ct. at 984.
190
191
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with the insiders from “the market’s scrutiny.”200 The distributional outcome of an alternate transaction was not put to a market
test in either case.201 The bankruptcy court, as a result, could
not determine whether the transaction that it approved included
a control premium in the form of a discounted price paid by a
controlling party, i.e., for the release given to the secured lenders in Jevic or for the equity given to the old shareholders in 203
N. LaSalle.202
The Jevic Court left open the rule for approval of interim
settlements in chapter 11, limiting the reach of its dicta to a
suggestion that some solicitude must be shown to the absolute
priority rule even when the transaction is not case-ending.203 I
assert below that market exposure of the estate claims and other
assets proposed to be transferred or released can address, in
many cases, the issues of control and collusion that gave rise to
the absolute priority rule. Market exposure thus can constitute
the basis on which a bankruptcy court approves an interim settlement challenged on the ground that it includes a priorityskipping control premium post-Jevic.
B. Market Exposure for Challenged Interim Settlements
Post-Jevic to Achieve the Remedial Purposes of the Absolute
Priority Rule
The absolute priority rule applies to end-of-case settlements
post-Jevic.204 More leeway was left for approval of interim settlements.205 The Court provided no precise definition of what might
be interim as opposed to end-of-case, though as discussed above,
there are both temporal and substantive aspects to this question.206
The Court, moreover, suggested that bankruptcy court approval even of interim transactions must demonstrate some respect
203 N. LaSalle, 526 U.S. at 456.
Czyzewski, 137 S. Ct. at 976; 203 N. LaSalle, 526 U.S. at 441.
202 Czyzewski, 137 S. Ct. at 976; 203 N. LaSalle, 526 U.S. at 441.
203 Czyzewski, 137 S. Ct. at 985–86.
204 Id. at 978 (“A distribution scheme ordered in connection with the dismissal
of a Chapter 11 case cannot, without the consent of the affected parties, deviate
from the basic priority rules that apply under the primary mechanisms the Code
establishes for final distributions of estate value in business bankruptcies.”).
205 Id. at 977, 985.
206 Id. at 983, 985.
200
201
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for, or as the Second Circuit described it, a “proper solicitude” to
the absolute priority rule.207
As set forth below, market exposure of a proposed settlement or other transaction with an insider or other controlling
party demonstrates a strong solicitude to the absolute priority
rule.208 The absolute priority rule arose to prevent a threatened
misallocation of estate value based on control and collusion,
supported by a hypothetical valuation or a contrived sale rather
than by a market valuation of estate assets proposed to be distributed to creditors.209 The Supreme Court in 203 N. LaSalle
stressed the need for market scrutiny to determine whether a
control premium was being distributed to existing owners, and
the Court in Jevic took issue with the bankruptcy court’s hypothetical valuation of the released claim, setting forth its counterhypothesis that a settlement that respected ordinary priorities
remained “a reasonable possibility.”210
Markets are extensive today—more than they were in the
19th century when the absolute priority rule arose,211 more than
in the 1930s when the reorganization provisions were added to the
Bankruptcy Act,212 and more than in 1978 when the Code was
enacted.213 Businesses are commonly sold in chapter 11, pursuant
to court orders that require marketing, competitive bidding processes, and public sales.214 Claims trading is extensive in large
chapter 11 cases, and secured and unsecured claims against a
chapter 11 debtor freely and regularly change hands.215
As markets have grown for ever-increasing amounts and
types of debt and other claims and property, including for the
Id. at 986.
See infra text accompanying notes 211–25.
209 Czyzewski, 137 S. Ct. at 984, 987.
210 Id. at 983; 203 N. Lasalle, 526 U.S. at 456.
211 Amendments to Bankruptcy Act, ch. 424, 48 Stat. 911 (1934) § 77B(f);
L.A. Lumber, 308 U.S. at 117, 123.
212 See generally Chandler Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-696, 52 Stat. 840 (1938)
(amending the Bankruptcy Act of 1898).
213 See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird, The New Face of Chapter 11, 12 AM. BANKR.
INST. L. REV. 69 (2004).
214 Id.
215 See, e.g., Harvey R. Miller & Shai Y. Waisman, Does Chapter 11 Reorganization Remain a Viable Option for Distressed Businesses for the Twenty-First
Century?, 78 AM. BANKR. L.J. 153, 181 (2004) (“distressed debt trading has grown
to proportions never contemplated” at the time the Code was enacted in 1978.”).
207
208
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assets of insolvent companies, so too has the justifiable distrust
of hypothetical, judicial valuations of those assets.216 While most
of the academic literature has focused on going concern or reorganization value, the problem applies equally to a claim that the
debtor has against a third party.217 Nearly all hypothetical, judicial valuations of a claim will be based on highly speculative
testimony regarding the time and expense of the debtor’s prosecuting the claim, the likelihood of the debtor’s success on the merits,
and, ultimately, the debtor’s ability to collect on any judgment,
and the bankruptcy court’s equally speculative determination following its hearing such testimony.218
A claim that a chapter 11 debtor has against a third party—
whether that third party is or is not an insider—is in one sense
simply an asset of the estate.219 The claim can be marketed and
sold to the highest and best buyer who believes that, at the price
paid, it will make a profit from prosecuting or settling the claim.220
The claim can be “marketed” to a lawyer, who will prosecute it under a contingency fee agreement that retains for the estate the
highest and best percentage of any recovery.221 The claim can be
marketed to an investor who makes the highest and best offer to
fund the litigation in exchange for a percentage of the proceeds
of any recovery.222
See, e.g., Kenneth Ayotte & Edward R. Morrison, Valuation Disputes in
Corporate Bankruptcy, 167 U. PA. L. REV (forthcoming 2018) (citing Walter J.
Blum, The Law and Language of Corporate Reorganization, 17 U. CHI. L. REV.
565, 572 (1950) (“[Judicial value] can never be objectively ascertained or verified
but always remains in the realm of opinion or belief.”)).
217 Id.
218 See id.
219 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (2012) (property of a debtor’s bankruptcy estate
includes “all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the
commencement of the case”); CHARLES JORDAN TABB, THE LAW OF BANKRUPTCY
397 (2d ed. 2009) (“Virtually all of the debtor’s property is swept into the
estate ….” Legislative history explains that property of the estate includes
“causes of action”) (citing H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 367 (1977)).
220 See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 363(b) (a chapter 11 debtor, “after notice and a hearing, may use, sell, or lease, outside the ordinary course of business, property
of the estate.”); In re Joseph, 330 B.R. 87 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2005).
221 Czyzewski, 137 S. Ct. at 983.
222 See, e.g., In re Charlotte Com. Group, Inc., No. B-01-52684 C-7W, 2002
WL 31055241 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 2002); Carmel, supra note 35, at 16–17. This
216
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The process by which a chapter 11 debtor obtains authority
to market and sell estate assets, including the debtor’s business,
through a competitive bidding process is well-developed.223 Chapter 11 debtors regularly seek bankruptcy court approval of bidding
procedures that provide for competitive bidding and, ultimately,
an auction of the estate assets being sold.224 This process often
involves the debtor’s having obtained an initial bidder for the
assets, whose offer is subject to higher and better bids.225 Courts
typically approve these procedures if they will encourage rather
than chill the bidding for the assets, and thereby maximize the
value that will be obtained from the sale of the assets.226
Can market exposure of the assets involved in a settlement that is challenged as case-ending and/or priority-skipping
be used to determine whether the distributions under the settlement include a control premium, or instead properly allocate
value to the debtor’s creditors and shareholders? I suggest that,
in many cases, it can.
Consider again the following example set forth in the Introduction to this Article. The debtor proposes to settle the debtor’s
claim against an insider by releasing the insider in exchange for
approach also has been urged to address certain asserted inadequacies in largescale, small-claim and derivative litigation. See, e.g., Jay Tidmarsh, Auctioning
Class Settlements, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 227 (2014); Geoffrey P. Miller, Competing Bids in Class Action Settlements, 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 633 (2003); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Auctioning Class Action and Derivative:
A Rejoinder, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 458 (1993); Randall S. Thomas & Robert G.
Hansen, Auctioning Class Action and Derivative Lawsuits: A Critical Analysis, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 423 (1993); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller,
The Plaintiffs’ Attorney’s Role in Class Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1991).
223 See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird, The New Face of Chapter 11, 12 AM. BANKR.
INST. L. REV. 69 (2004).
224 See, e.g., Harvey R. Miller & Shai Y. Waisman, Does Chapter 11 Reorganization Remain a Viable Option for Distressed Businesses for the Twenty-First
Century?, 78 AM. BANKR. L.J. 153, 194–96 (2004).
225 See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird, The New Face of Chapter 11, 12 AM. BANKR.
INST. L. REV. 69 (2004); In re O’Brien Environmental Energy, Inc., 181 F.3d 527,
537 (3rd Cir. 1999).
226 See, e.g., Del. Bankr. L.R. 6004-1 (2017) (for the disclosures required to
be made to the bankruptcy court that enable the court to determine whether
to approve the proposed bidding procedures because they are likely to maximize value and do not chill bidding).
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a settlement payment. The question of whether the insider is receiving a control premium—in the form of having to pay a lower
settlement price than what the claim is worth (thus also reducing eventual distributions to other creditors)—is clearly at issue.
The debtor’s claim against the insider, though, can be marketed
for outright sale to an arm’s-length third-party buyer, or to an
investor who will fund the costs of the litigation in return for a
percentage of any recovery on the claim. A higher and better bid
for the claim from a third-party buyer or investor removes the
issue of whether a control premium is being paid to the insider—
the costs and benefits of the transaction are now with the third
party who is not in control. If, on the other hand, the settlement
was vigorously marketed and no higher bid was obtained, a strong
case can be made that the insider’s bid reflects the highest and
best market price for the claim. The insider is not receiving a
control premium in the form of a discount because if the claim
was worth more, a third party would have bid more.
Consider, as a second example, an interim settlement similar
to the case-ending settlement in Jevic.227 The debtor has a claim
against a secured lender who is willing to pay a settlement amount
to the estate to settle the claim. But the lender will agree to do so
only if distributions of the settlement amount skip over a group
of creditors who the lender fears will use their distribution of the
settlement proceeds as a litigation fund to sue the lender on another
claim that they have against the lender. The creditors group
objects to approval of the settlement, arguing that it is priorityskipping and that the lender has colluded with the debtor’s
management to exercise control over the debtor at the expense of
the creditors group. The issue of whether the lender is receiving
a control premium, in the form of a bargain settlement amount,
is present.
The debtor’s claim against the lender, in this example too,
can be marketed for outright sale to an arm’s-length third-party
buyer, or to an investor who will fund the costs of the litigation
in return for a percentage of any recovery on the claim. As with
the prior example, a higher and better bid for the claim from a
third-party buyer or investor removes the issue of whether a
227

Czyzewski, 137 S. Ct. at 980–82.
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control premium is being paid to the lender because, again, the
costs and benefits of the transaction are now with the third party
who is not in control. If, on the other hand, no higher bid was
obtained after a vigorous marketing process, the market exposure would indicate that the claim has no value other than to the
lender, whose bid reflects the highest and best market price for the
claim, even with the priority-skipping. The lender is not receiving
a control premium in the form of a discount because, if the claim
was worth more, a third party would have bid more. The lender
simply does not want to fund litigation against itself.
Exposing settlements to market scrutiny can, in sum, address the issue of the misallocation of estate value based on control
and collusion that gave rise to the absolute priority rule. Hypothetical valuations—such as those that concerned the Court in both
Jevic and 203 N. LaSalle—are poor and suspect substitutes.228
Issues can be expected to recur in some cases, even if this
approach is taken. Most turn on the market for and the marketing of such claims or other assets. Aspects of both bankruptcy
and non-bankruptcy law pose other, special issues.229
Foremost, a rule relying on market exposure requires, to
state the obvious, a robust marketing and sale process.230 Inadequate marketing, restrictions on potential bidders’ access to information, no-shop provisions, exclusionary bidder qualification
rules, unnecessary or excessive break-up fees, excessive overbid
Id. at 983, 986; 203 N. LaSalle, 526 U.S. at 45658.
See infra text accompanying notes 23337.
230 Such a marketing process includes establishing a sufficient marketing
period, providing the necessary information to prospective bidders, contacting
prospective buyers, negotiating with prospective “stalking horse” bidders one
of whom will set a floor by making an initial bid, providing an incentive such
as a breakup fee to the initial bidder (which initial bid will be subject to higher
bids of other bidders who then bid against it), and establishing overbid minimums and other rules for an auction when more than one prospective bidder
is obtained. The auction should provide an opportunity to creditors who hold liens
against the asset being sold to credit bid at the auction. 11 U.S.C. § 363(k)
(2012). Bankruptcy Judge Frank Santoro (Bankr. E.D. Va.) suggests that the
bidding procedures approved by the court might also permit credit bidding by
creditors who hold priority unsecured claims under Code section 507, though
credit bidding by priority unsecured creditors is not expressly provided for in
the Code. 11 U.S.C. §§ 507, 363(k) (2012).
228
229
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requirements, and similar provisions that chill rather than encourage bidding will skew the market exposure and reduce the
market price.231 To the extent that these flaws favor an insider,
they make a control premium more likely.232 Bankruptcy courts
have developed court rules and precedents that encourage a
warm and healthy bidding process and many courts have extensive experience in ruling on these bidding procedure issues in a
manner that maximizes market exposure in connection with any
auction of a debtor’s assets.233 But absent a bankruptcy court’s
rigorous application of such rules the market exposure will be
lost, the value of estate assets and distributions to creditors will
diminish, and control premiums will be paid.234
“Gifting” by a senior stakeholder, such as by a secured creditor to a junior stakeholder, that skips over an intermediate stakeholder, poses a related bankruptcy law issue.235 The question for the
bankruptcy court is whether such distribution is a “true gift”
because it is made from the secured creditor’s property or is disguised priority-skipping because the distribution is made from
estate assets.236 Market exposure of the estate’s assets resolves
See, e.g., In re O’Brien Environmental Energy, Inc., 181 F.3d 527 (3d
Cir. 1999) (considering whether proposed break-up fee would encourage bidding on
the debtor’s assets, and thus maximize value, or would instead chill that bidding
by driving away prospective competing bidders to the detriment of the debtor’s
estate and creditors).
232 See, e.g., Bank of Am. Nat’l Tr. & Sav. Ass’n v. 203 N. LaSalle St. P’ship,
526 U.S. 434, 444 (1999) (citing H.R. Doc. No. 93-137, pt. I, p. 255 (1973) (discussing concern with “the ability of a few insiders, whether management or
major creditors, to use the reorganization process to gain an unfair advantage”));
In re O’Brien Environmental Energy, Inc., 181 F.3d at 536 (asking whether
the relationship of the parties who negotiated the break-up fee was “tainted
by self-dealing or manipulation”).
233 See, e.g., 6004-1; In re Family Christian, LLC, 533 B.R. 600 (Bankr. W.D.
Mich. 2015).
234 See, e.g., Roe & Skeel, supra note 159, at 747 (criticizing the bidding
procedures in Chrysler for discouraging competing bids, including by requiring a
competing bid to “conform substantially to the terms set out in the Treasury’s
proposed Purchase Agreement,” prohibiting bidders from bidding on Chrysler’s
assets free of its liabilities, and restricting bids “on other configurations of a
reorganized Chrysler.”).
235 In re ICL Holding Co., Inc., 802 F.3d 547, 555 (3d Cir. 2015) (“The Code’s
distribution rules don’t apply to nonestate [sic] property.”).
236 Id.
231
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this issue in many cases.237 Once the senior secured creditor’s share
of the estate has been determined by a market sale and its share
of the sale proceeds have been distributed (or held for ultimate
distribution) to it, any payment made by it to others is a true
gift.238 By contrast, a hypothetical valuation of the secured creditor’s collateral, and an allocation of part of that value to a junior
stakeholder, fails to resolve the question of priority-skipping
because the valuation is speculative.239
But while market exposure enables the court to preclude
control premiums with respect to the settlement of claims that
237 See, e.g., Bank of Am. Nat’l Tr. & Sav. Ass’n, 526 U.S. at 455–56 (requiring the opportunity given to insiders to acquire the equity interests in the
reorganized debtor to be subjected to competing, potentially higher bids by
third parties).
238 In In re ICL Holding Co., Inc., decided by the Third Circuit contemporaneously with its Jevic decision, the debtor tried to sell its assets to at least
seven potential “suitors.” The highest third-party bid reflected a recovery to
the debtor’s secured lenders of only 80–85 percent of their debt. The secured
lenders exercised their right to credit bid under Code section 363(k), and credit
bid 90 percent of the face amount of their debt, which was the highest bid for
the debtor’s assets. The bidding fixed the value of the estate’s assets (including
the debtor’s cash on hand) at 90 percent of the secured lenders’ claim, which
is the amount that they paid for the assets pursuant to the credit bid. But a
secured creditor whose winning bid is less than the amount of its claim pays
for the assets it purchased by reducing its secured claim by the amount of the
credit bid, and pays no cash to the estate. So, upon the secured lenders’ successful credit bid, they owned the assets of the estate without having to pay any
cash for them and nothing was left of the estate. Thus, the up to $1.8 million
to be paid from the cash on hand to the debtor’s and the creditors committee’s
lawyers and accountants was not property of debtor’s estate, and the secured
lenders’ agreement to pay such sum was a “true gift.” In re ICL Holding Co.,
Inc., 802 F.3d at 55051, 55556.
239 In re Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 432 F.3d 507, 509, 514 (3d Cir. 2005)
(finding that none of the distributions of estate property had been exposed to
the market). The plan in Armstrong provided for a distribution to a class of
unsecured creditors, who would waive their distribution in favor of the owners of
the common stock of the debtor. The bankruptcy court confirmed the plan. The
district court reversed, distinguishing a payment by a secured creditor with a
perfected lien because in such case the collateral is not estate property subject
to distribution under the Code’s absolute priority rule, and the payment is a
“carve out” being made from “a portion of its lien proceeds.” The Third Circuit
affirmed the district court’s reversal of plan confirmation. In re Armstrong, 432
F.3d at 514.
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are purely within the estate, and to determine whether a priorityskipping payment is a “true gift,” the problem becomes more
difficult if the proposed settlement or gift includes rights that do
not strictly belong to the estate.240 Some settlements involving
multiple parties may provide for distributions of assets in which
both the estate and another party has an interest, and thus are
outside of what some commentators have described as the “bankruptcy partition.”241 The structured dismissal in Jevic arguably
extended beyond the partition in one aspect, because by the bankruptcy court’s approving it the drivers lost the power to bring
their own avoidance action against Sun Capital and CIT based on
the same leveraged buyout.242 This problem likely will involve a
fairly small percentage of settlements and other transactions,
though in some cases it will be very difficult to resolve.243
Standing issues pose special problems. Questions regarding an assignee’s standing or authority to prosecute a claim may
suppress the market for the outright purchase of claims from a
chapter 11 debtor. The outright sale of certain kinds of claims, such
as a receivable or other contract claim, normally gives standing
to the purchaser.244 Sales of avoidance actions (such as the one in
Jevic) or tort claims, though, can present special standing issues
because some courts have interpreted the Code to limit the prosecution of avoidance actions to the trustee or debtor in possession
240 See Baird et al., The Bankruptcy Partition (Univ. of Chi. Coase-Sandor
Inst. for Law & Econ., Research Paper No. 848, 2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract
=3110210 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3110210.
241 Id.
242 Czyzewski, 137 S. Ct. at 983.
243 Baird et al., supra note 240, at 5. Moreover, bankruptcy jurisdiction is
essentially in rem. Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356 (2006). Accordingly, the court’s jurisdiction and authority over property that is not property
of the bankruptcy estate is highly problematic.
244 6 Am. Jur. 2d § 134 (Aug. 2018 update) (assignee “stands in the shoes
of the assignor” and has standing to prosecute claim); 6A C.J.S. Assignments
§§ 88, 94 (Sept. 2018 update) (“A valid assignment generally operates to vest
in the assignee the same right title, or interest that the assignor had in the
thing assigned,” and in “most states, in the absence of a contrary intention,
an assignee acquires the same rights as the assignor to protect and enforce
the assigned rights, including the right to maintain a civil action.”); Uniform
Commercial Code § 9-404 (receivables); 29 Williston on Contracts § 74:56 (4th
ed.) (under U.C.C. section 9-404, “just as was the case under the common law
and under the earlier version of the [Uniform Commercial Code], the assignee
steps into the shoes of the assignor”).
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(excluding a purchaser of the claim),245 or because the transfer
might be champertous or “meddlesome” under state law.246
But courts increasingly allow the sale of such a claim in a
bankruptcy proceeding when doing so is in the best interest of
estate and its creditors.247 Some courts have held that a debtor
245 11 U.S.C. § 547(b), 548(1)(a) (2012); Harris Winsberg & Michele J. Kim,
Unlocking Value: Can a Trustee Sell Avoidance Claims Grounded in Section
544(B), 547 or 548 of the Bankruptcy Code?, 22 No. 2 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC, NL
2 ART. 2 (2013).
246
“Maintenance” at common law is “an officious intermeddling
in a suit that in no way belongs to the meddler, and signifies
an unlawful taking in hand, or upholding of quarrels or sides,
to the disturbance or hindrance of common right.” “Champerty”
is a species of maintenance and “is the unlawful maintenance
of a suit in consideration of part of the matter in controversy.”
Traditionally, at common law, maintenance and champerty of
personal injury tort claims has been forbidden based on a policy
that protected the injured party “so that an unrelated thirdparty cannot reap a windfall by paying the injured party a pittance for the claim and then prosecute litigation for injuries that
the party never suffered.”
In re Brown, 354 B.R. 100, 105 (Bankr. N.D. W. Va. 2006).
247 See, e.g., In re Moore, 608 F.3d 253, 257 (5th Cir. 2010) (“As a general
matter, a trustee may sell causes of action belonging to the estate.”); In re Mickey
Thompson Ent. Group, Inc., 292 B.R. 415, 42122 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2003) (equating
a settlement of a debtor’s litigation claim with the sale of the claim to the
defendant, and holding that, when confronted with a motion to approve a
settlement of a claim, “a bankruptcy court is obliged to consider, as part of
the ‘fair and equitable’ analysis” applicable to Rule 9019 settlements, whether
the claim “might draw a higher price through a competitive process and be
the proper subject of a section 363 sale”); William P. Weintraub & Barry Z.
Bazian, Avoiding the Avoidable: The Uncertainty of Selling Avoidance Actions, 26
No. 6 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. NL ART. 2 (2017) (“Several recent decisions have held
that a trustee was not permitted to assign avoidance claims to a creditor that
wanted to pursue the claims for the creditor’s own benefit. These decisions
suggest that the result may have been different had the trustee or creditor
requested derivative standing to pursue the claims on behalf of the estate.”);
Winsberg & Kim, supra note 245, at 2 (courts approve such sales under two
primary approaches: (1) granting derivative standing to the claims purchaser,
if the suit by the purchaser is in the best interest of the estate and is necessary and beneficial to the fair and efficient resolution of the bankruptcy proceeding, or if the purchaser is pursuing interests common to all creditors, and
allowing the purchaser to pursue the claim will benefit the remaining creditors; and (2) analyzing the sale under Bankruptcy Code section 363(b), and
authorizing the sale if the debtor has articulated a business justification,
good business judgment, or sound business reasons for the proposed sale, and
the sale price is the highest and best offer).
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or trustee must consider a higher bid from a third party for a claim
that its proposes to settle with the defendant.248 The doctrines of
champerty and maintenance likely do not apply to marketing
the claims to a litigation financier, or to a purchaser of a percentage
of any recovery on the claim, or to a contingency fee law firm,
which process can provide the market exposure necessary to prevent the payment from the estate of premiums based on control.249
There also are times when market exposure cannot be obtained or will be limited. Such exposure will be limited, for example,
at the first-day hearing in a chapter 11 bankruptcy case. I suggest
in the next Part that a different rule is preferable at that time.
III. THE TEMPORAL SWAY OF THE ABSOLUTE PRIORITY RULE—
FIRST-DAY ORDERS AND THE DIFFICULTY OF MAKING A
HYPOTHETICAL VALUATION OF ULTIMATE ESTATE VALUE AND
PLAN DISTRIBUTIONS EARLY IN A CHAPTER 11 CASE
A crucial aspect of the Court’s decision in Jevic is what the
Court did not do.250 Jevic does not restrict the bankruptcy courts’
authority to approve priority-skipping first-day transfers on account
of certain prepetition claims, including to employees, to customers,
to certain suppliers who are critical to the chapter 11 debtor’s
See, e.g., In re Mickey Thompson Ent. Group, Inc., 292 B.R. at 420–22.
See, e.g., Charge Injection Tech. Inc. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co.,
C.A. No. N07C-12-134-JRJ, 2016 WL 937400, at *3–4 (Del. Super. Ct. 2016)
(holding that a litigation financing agreement, under which the defendant
alleged that the borrower had “signed away all rights to litigation proceeds,”
but which the court found gave the litigation funder no right to direct, control,
or settle the claims, was not a champertous assignment because “there was no
assignment” and the original plaintiff remained the bona fide owner of the
claims;” nor was it “maintenance involv[ing] officious intermeddling … for
purposes of stirring up litigation and strife”). See also Carmel, supra note 35,
at 17 (“Although there has only been a limited number of litigation-finance
arrangements in bankruptcy to date, nothing prevents a debtor from entering
into such an arrangement with bankruptcy court approval if necessary. Simply
put, a debtor’s meritorious litigation claims are assets, and litigation finance
is often the best way to maximize the value of those assets.”); Kevin LaCroix,
Delaware Court Rejects Challenge to Litigation Funding Arrangement, LITIG.
FIN. (Mar. 23, 2016), https://www.dandodiary.com/2016/03/articles/litigation-fi
nancing-2/delaware-court-rejects-challenge-to-litigation-funding-arrangement/
[https://perma.cc/CSV3-SQN5].
250 See infra text accompanying notes 258–59.
248
249
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operations, or to a secured lender who, it is proved to the court’s
satisfaction, is willing to advance needed postpetition funds only
pursuant to a “roll-up,” under which the lender’s prepetition claim
is paid down first from the debtor’s postpetition operating revenues.251 It also did not resolve the split between jurisdictions that
apply the doctrine of necessity and those that apply the Kmart
rule in determining whether to approve first-day relief.252
Part III considers, first, the reasons for first-day relief, and,
second, the circuit split on priority-skipping first-day relief.253 It
then parses the difficulty of determining eventual enterprise value
and distributions to creditors under a hypothetical plan, as required by Kmart.254
Because, in nearly all cases, this determination will be based
on conjecture, this Part concludes that the rule going forward
should presume the benefit of preserving the debtor’s business as a
going concern. It should require, though, that the chapter 11 debtor
prove (as is required by the doctrine of necessity) that it diligently
has sought alternative suppliers in the market, and has failed to
obtain them.
This approach addresses the excessive first-day relief of
which some critics, rightfully, complain.255 It does so without engaging in the unreliable predictions of ultimate distributions required
by Kmart, and without sacrificing the going concern value, supplier relationships and jobs that first-day relief preserves.
A. Why First-Day Relief in Chapter 11?
First-day relief has become a common feature of chapter 11
practice.256 Hope springs eternal, or nearly so, for many chapter
11 debtors at the beginning of a bankruptcy case. Chapter 11
Czyzewski, 137 S. Ct. at 986 (citing DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, ELEMENTS OF
BANKRUPTCY 232–34 (6th ed. 2014); Mark J. Roe & Frederick Tung, Breaking
Bankruptcy Priority: How Rent-Seeking Upends the Creditors’ Bargain, 99
VA. L. REV. 1235, 1250–64 (2003)).
252 See Roe & Tung, supra note 251, at 1255–57.
253 See infra Section III.A & B.
254 See infra text accompanying notes 335–77.
255 See infra Section III.B.
256 See generally DEBRA L. GRASSGREEN ET AL., FIRST DAY MOTIONS: A GUIDE
TO THE CRITICAL FIRST DAYS OF A BANKRUPTCY CASE (3d ed. 2012) for a comprehensive treatment of first-day relief.
251
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gives a struggling business the prospect of a better future, in which
insurmountable debt is restructured and reduced, and the reorganized debtor returns to profitability.257
The chapter 11 debtor, though, is in a vulnerable position
early in the case. Many of the debtor’s employees, customers, suppliers, and lenders may have lost confidence in the enterprise and
are intent on reducing their own losses and risk, using whatever
leverage they have. Yet the debtor needs the labor, custom, and
credit of certain key counterparties to persist and to reorganize.
First-day relief can be essential to the debtor’s maintaining its
operations for long enough for it to sell its business as a going
concern or otherwise reorganize in chapter 11.258
First-day motions typically are filed by a chapter 11 debtor
with its voluntary petition.259 Court approval is required.260
Bankruptcy courts regularly enter first-day orders following the
first hearing in the case, held within a day or two of the filing of
the case.261 Common first-day orders include those that permit
Id.
See, e.g., In re The Colad Group, Inc., 324 B.R. 208, 212 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y.
2005) (“In bankruptcy practice, the phrase ‘first day motions’ refers generally
to any of a variety of requests made shortly after the filing of a chapter 11
petition, for prompt authorizations needed to facilitate the operation of the
debtor’s business.”).
259 John D. Ayer et al., The Life Cycle of a Chapter 11 Debtor Through the
Debtor’s Eyes: Part I, ABI J. (Sept. 2003).
260 Court approval is required under various Code provisions. Code section
363(c) requires court approval of the chapter 11 debtor’s use of cash in which
another party, such as the debtor’s secured lender has a lien. 11 U.S.C. § 363(c).
Code section 364 requires court approval of postpetition secured financing and
other extensions of credit, other than credit (such as trade credit) that is in the
ordinary course of the debtor’s business. Id. § 364. Courts restricting a chapter 11 debtor’s ability to pay unsecured prepetition claims prior to the final
distributions in the case have cited the Code’s silence regarding authority rather
than an express prohibition in the Code. See, e.g., In re Kmart Corp., 359 F.3d
at 871.
261 First-day hearing procedures and orders are authorized by the local
bankruptcy rules of many jurisdictions. Many bankruptcy courts schedule the
hearing on these first-day motions for the first or second business day after
the case is filed. See, e.g., Del. Bankr. L.R. 9013-1(m) (2017) (providing for consideration by the court of motions filed with, or contemporaneously with, the
chapter 11 petition, on less than seven days’ notice, provided that they are
“confined to matters of a genuinely emergent nature required to preserve the
assets of the estate and to maintain ongoing business operations and such other
257
258
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the debtor to pay critical vendors on account of their prepetition
claims;262 to honor prepetition customer warranties, credits, gift
cards and promotions;263 and to pay prepetition wages to honor
paid time off and other benefits earned prepetition by the debtor’s employees.264
B. The Circuit Split on Priority-Skipping First-Day Relief—The
Doctrine of Necessity and Kmart
These payments and transfers usually are priority-skipping
at the time they are made.265 A payment to a critical vendor on
account of its non-priority prepetition claim, for example, skips over
matters as the Court may determine appropriate”); Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1002-1(b)
(providing that “[t]o the extent practicable, when a prospective chapter 11
debtor or chapter 15 petitioner anticipates the need to seek orders for immediate relief, counsel for the debtor or petitioner shall contact the United States
Trustee and the Clerk prior to filing a voluntary petition for relief under
chapter 11 or chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code, for the purpose of advising
the United States Trustee and the Clerk of the anticipated filing of the petition (without disclosing the identity of the debtor or petitioner) and the matters on which the debtor or petitioner intends to seek immediate relief ”;
Bankr. S.D. Fla. 9013-1(F) (providing that first-day motions, including those
for authority to use cash collateral, for approval of postpetition financing, for
authority to pay postpetition wages outstanding on the petition date, for authority to maintain prepetition bank accounts, and for authority to pay prepetition claims based on the “doctrine of necessity,” shall be scheduled within
two business days, if reasonably possible).
262 Critical vendors “are commonly defined as essential vendors or suppliers
who are indispensable to the debtor’s business—either because of the types of
goods or services they supply, their knowledge of the debtor’s business, or some
other unique aspect to the business relationship—and without whom the debtor
likely cannot achieve a successful reorganization.” ABI Report, supra note 9,
at 97. Most critical vendor claims are general unsecured claims and are junior to
unsecured priority claims under Code § 507(a).
263 Most customer claims are general unsecured claims and are junior to
administrative expense claims and other unsecured claims that have priority
under Code § 507(a). See 11 U.S.C. § 507(a) (2012).
264 Employee claims for salary and wages are fourth priority unsecured claims
pursuant to § 507(a)(4), subject to a $12,850 per employee cap, and employee
benefit claims are fifth priority unsecured claims pursuant to § 507(a)(5), subject
to a different cap. Both claims are junior to administrative expense claims and
other unsecured claims that have a higher priority unsecured under Code § 507(a).
See 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)–(b) (2012).
265 See ABI Report, supra note 9, at 101.
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holders of priority unsecured claims.266 Payment to an employee
on account of her lower priority claim for prepetition salary and
benefits skips over administrative expense claimants (including
the debtor’s and the creditors committee’s lawyers) who have a
higher priority.267 All of these claims paid pursuant to first-day
orders also are junior to secured claims to the extent of the value
of each secured party’s collateral.268
The reasons given for priority-skipping first-day orders vary
somewhat, depending on the type of payment or transfer. If a supplier or service provider who provides an essential product or service to the debtor is not paid, it will cease providing the debtor
with the goods or services;269 if credits owed to customers, or gift
cards and promotions, are not honored, the debtor will lose its
customers;270 and if employees are not paid what the debtor owes
them on the first payday after the commencement of the case,
See id. at 98, n.337.
See id. at 98.
268 “Property interests are created and defined by state law” in a bankruptcy case, under the Supreme Court’s holdings in Butner v. United States,
440 U.S. 48, 54–55 (1979) (1898 Act case) and Nobelman v. Am. Sav. Bank,
113 S. Ct. 2106, 2109 (1993) (1978 Code case, following Butner). In a debtor’s
bankruptcy proceeding, state law establishes the extent, validity, and priority
of liens and other interests in the debtor’s property. Thus, under bankruptcy’s
distributional priorities, the secured creditor who holds a lien is entitled to
payment of its claim up to the amount of the value of its collateral prior to
any payment to unsecured creditors, such as the debtor’s employees and
customers, whose claims are unsecured.
269 See, e.g., In re Just for Feet, Inc., 242 B.R. 821, 826 (D.Del. 1999)
Clearly, Just for Feet cannot survive unless it has name brand
sneakers and athletic apparel to sell in its stores. The Debtors
need a continuous supply of inventory from athletic footwear
and apparel vendors such as Nike, New Balance, Fila, Reebok,
Adidas, Asics, K-Swiss and Converse. Rockey testified that without new merchandise from these vendors, Just For Feet will not
survive. Therefore, the court finds that payment of the prepetition claims of certain trade vendors—the athletic footwear
and apparel vendors—is essential to the survival of the debtor
during the chapter 11 reorganization.
270 See, e.g., In re Hawker Beechcraft, Inc., 486 B.R. 264, 272 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
2013) (first-day customer programs motion approved on testimony that “[a]ny
interruption or discontinuation of the Customer Programs risks the permanent loss of certain customers.”).
266
267
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they will quit.271 But the underlying rationale is consistent: in
most cases the debtor and its creditors are better off if the court
preserves the debtor’s operations and going concern value by
authorizing the payment.272
The temporal distinction between transfers made under
first-day orders, the authority for which the Jevic Court did not
disturb, and distributions made pursuant to case-ending settlements, which was the focus of the Court, is clear.273 The ultimate
outcome of the case, with respect to the debtor’s creditors and
equity holders and the very survival of the company, is speculative at the start of the case.274 The value of the debtor, its assets,
and the distributions that will be made to creditors at the end of
the case if the debtor continues to operate its business and reorganizes under a plan are highly speculative.275 Indeed, some
commentators have described it as “axiomatic” that valuations
are uncertain at the moment that a debtor files for bankruptcy.276
At the time of a structured dismissal or other end-of-case
distribution, by contrast, the die is cast. It is clear at the end of the
case whether some junior creditors or equity holders are receiving a distribution prior to payment in full to senior creditors in a
manner that is inconsistent with the absolute priority rule.277
Moreover, end-of-case transfers normally have no effect on
the debtor’s survival or longer-term profitability.278 The purpose
271 ABI Report, supra note 9, at 102 (recognizing that first-day employee
compensation motions “are often noncontroversial and ultimately granted by
the court,” because “[m]any courts, debtors, and commentators recognize the
value to the debtor of receiving uninterrupted service from its employees.”).
272 See id. at 184, 235 n.792.
273 See Czyzewski, 137 S. Ct. at 985–86 (discussing priority-violating distributions and first day wage orders).
274 See id. at 986 (stating that the results of the case are speculative).
275 See ABI Report, supra note 9, at 11 n.40 (discussing the uncertainty
and inefficiencies of the chapter 11 process).
276 Melissa B. Jacoby & Edward J. Janger, Ice Cube Bonds: Allocating the
Price of Process in Chapter 11 Bankruptcy, 123 YALE L.J. 862, 896 (2013). Others
have concluded that “[n]onmarket valuations are necessarily imprecise,” even
at the end of the case when the plan has been formulated, “and the judge can
do little more than find that any particular plan falls within a broad range of
reasonable.” Douglas G. Baird, Bankruptcy’s Quiet Revolution, 91 AM. L.J.
593, 594 (2017).
277 See Jacoby & Janger, supra note 276, at 890 (absolute priority rule).
278 See id. at 880 (discussing cases such as Lionel, where creditors failed to
illustrate the need for speedy transfers).
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of preserving going concern value by priority-skipping transfers
often is gone at the end of the case.279 That upside, by then in
most cases, has been captured or lost.280
The Jevic Court left undisturbed the bankruptcy courts’
authority to grant priority-skipping first-day relief, recognizing
that “one can generally find significant Code-related objectives”
that the priority-violating first-day transfers serve.281 The Court
reasoned that the bankruptcy courts granting such relief “have
usually found that the distributions at issue would ‘enable a successful reorganization and make even the disfavored creditors
better off.’”282
The Jevic Court shied away from going further though. In
particular, the Court did not address the circuit split over the
two primary rules under which bankruptcy courts grant firstday relief: the doctrine of necessity, which is applied in the Third
Circuit and other courts,283 and the Kmart standard, applied by
See id. at 881, 894 (elaborating on concern values and speed premiums
in bankruptcy sales).
280 See id. at 891 n.115, 894 (analyzing going-concern value and the means
to preserve it).
281 Czyzewski, 137 S. Ct. at 985.
282 Id. (quoting In re Kmart Corp., 359 F.3d at 872).
283 In re Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 467 F.2d at 102 n.1 (Act case)
A number of cases declare a so-called ‘necessity of payment’ exception to the normal deferment of the payment of pre-reorganization
claims until their disposition can be made part of a plan of reorganization. These cases permit immediate payment of claims
of creditors where those creditors will not supply services or
material essential to the conduct of the business until their
pre-reorganization claims shall have been paid.
In re Just for Feet, Inc., 242 B.R. at 824 (Code case). Case law tends to use the
term “doctrine of necessity” and “necessity of payment rule” interchangeably, and
I have done so in this Article. Some commentators have drawn a distinction
between the doctrine of necessity, which more precisely applies in chapter 11
“to authorize the postpetition payment of prepetition employee wages, benefits and services when the failure to make those payments would be catastrophic,” and the necessity of payment rule, which more precisely applies in
railroad reorganizations to authorize the trustee “to pay claims where such
payment is exacted as the price of providing goods or services indispensably
necessary to continuing the rail service.” Russell A. Eisenberg & Frances F.
Gecker, The Doctrine of Necessity and Its Parameters, 73 MARQ. L. REV. 1, 2–3
(1989) (quoting In re Boston & Maine Corp., 634 F.2d 1359, 1382 (1st Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 982 (1981)). The two rules:
279
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share the same underlying policy rationale. Both principles are
premised on the bankruptcy goal of maintaining the prospects
for a viable reorganization during the early stages of a case.
Both principles embody the fact that there are some prepetition creditors who must be paid immediately because if they
are not paid, everyone else will suffer.
Id. at 4. Courts that have followed the “doctrine of necessity” or “necessity of
payment rule” in determining whether to authorize pre-plan payments of prepetition claims include: 1st Cir. court cases: Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. Boston
& Maine Corp. (In re Boston & Maine Corp.), 634 F.2d 1359, 1382 (1st Cir. 1980)
(Act case)
[T]he rule is not based on considerations of equity but is a device for handling a threat to the continued operation of the
railroad during reorganization ... it would not be a rule conferring a right of recovery on the claimant but a rule of exculpation, protecting the trustee who paid under economic duress
for a supply or service indispensable to continued operation of
the railroad.
J.M. Blanco, Inc. v. PMC Mktg. Corp., No. 09-1781(GAG), 2009 WL 5184458,
at *5 (D.P.R. 2009) (citing In re CoServ, LLC, 273 B.R. 487, 498 (Bankr. N.D.
Tex. 2002)) (finding necessity of payment authority in Code section 105(a),
which authorizes the bankruptcy court to enter orders “necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of” the Bankruptcy Code; the court reasoned
that the debtor in possession is a fiduciary, with a duty “to protect and preserve the estate, including an operating business’s going concern value,” and
the bankruptcy court “is authorized to use its equitable powers under section
105(a) in aid of preservation or enhancement of the estate.”); see also 11
U.S.C. § 105(a) (2012); In re Zenus Is Jewelry, Inc., 378 B.R. 432, 434 (Bankr.
D.N.H. 2007) (recognizing doctrine but denying authority to pay critical vendors because the evidence showed that they would supply the debtor on a COD
basis). 3d Cir. court cases: In re Lehigh & New England Ry. Co., 657 F.2d
570, 581 (3d Cir. 1981) (railroad receivership case) (citing In re New York,
New Haven & Hartford R.R. Co., 278 F. Supp. 592, 602 n.15 (D. Conn. 1967),
aff’d, 405 F.2d 50 (2d Cir. 1968), and cert. denied, 349 U.S. 999 (1969)) (“[T]he
‘necessity of payment’ doctrine ... teaches no more than, if payment of a claim
which arose prior to reorganization is essential to the continued operation of
the railroad during reorganization, payment may be authorized even if it is
made out of corpus.”); In re Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 467 F.2d at 104; In re
Just for Feet, Inc., 242 B.R. at 824–25 (Code case); In re Columbia Gas Sys., Inc.,
171 B.R. 189, 191–92 (Bankr. D. Del. 1994) (Code case). 4th Cir. court cases:
In re Synteen Tech., Inc., No. 00-02203-W, 2000 WL 33709667, at *2 (Bankr.
D.S.C. 2000) (critical vendor payments); In re NVR L.P., 147 B.R. 126, 128
(Bankr. E.D. Va. 1992) (recognizing the necessity of payment doctrine but declining to authorize the payments because the threat posed by non-payment was
“too remote and speculative to justify invoking” the doctrine). 5th Cir. court
cases: In re CEI Roofing, Inc., 315 B.R. 50, 60 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2004) (authorizing first-day wage order on the ground that prepetition wage claims have
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the Seventh Circuit and other courts, which requires a showing
that the creditors who do not receive first-day payments will be
as well off in the reorganization which the first-day payments
purportedly enable, as they would be in the liquidation that
might result if the first-day payments were not made to the favored creditors.284
The difference between the two rules is fairly simple: the
doctrine of necessity presumes a benefit in the debtor’s continuing to operate while the Kmart rule requires proof of it.
The necessity of payment doctrine had its origin in the
equity receiverships by which railroads were reorganized prior to
the enactment of the reorganization provisions of the Bankruptcy
Act in the 1930s.285 The doctrine permits “immediate payment of
priority under Code section 503(a) (3), without considering whether the payment might ultimately result in priority-skipping, e.g., because senior, administrative expense claims ultimately might not be fully paid); In re CoServ,
LLC, 273 B.R. 487, 498 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2002) (CoServ is best characterized
as a variant of the necessity of payment doctrine: “First, it must be critical that
the debtor deal with the claimant. Second, unless it deals with the claimant, the
debtor risks the probability of harm, or, alternatively, loss of economic advantage
to the estate or the debtor’s going concern value, which is disproportionate to
the amount of the claimant’s prepetition claim. Third, there is no practical or
legal alternative by which the debtor can deal with the claimant other than
by payment of the claim.”); see also B & W Enter. v. Goodman Oil Co. (In re B
& W Enter.), 713 F.2d 534, 537 (9th Cir. 2010) (declining to extend the necessity of payment doctrine beyond railroad cases to a trucking company)
Absent compelling reasons, we deem it unwise to tamper with
the statutory priority scheme devised by Congress in the 1978
Act. ... Even if we were convinced that the Necessity of Payment
Rule survived the 1978 Act, appellants have not presented to
this court sufficient justification for extending the Necessity
of Payment Rule to trucking reorganizations.
In re EcoSmart, No. 2:15-bk-27139-RK, 2015 WL 9274245, at *9 (Bankr. C.D.
Cal. 2015) (only priority prepetition claims, such as employee claims, may be
paid immediately postpetition under the doctrine of necessity).
284 See In re Kmart Corp., 359 F.3d at 872 (requiring the debtor to show
that “that the disfavored creditors will be as well off with reorganization as with
liquidation—a demonstration never attempted” in Kmart (emphasis in original)); see also In re Tropical Sportswear Int’l Corp., 320 B.R. 15, 17–18
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2005); In re Corner Home Care, Inc., 438 B.R. 122, 126–27
(Bankr. W.D. Ky. 2010); In re Jeans.com, Inc., 502 B.R. 250, 253 (Bankr. D.P.R.
2013); In re United Am., 327 B.R. at 781–82, 784 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2005).
285 See, e.g., Gregg v. Metro. Tr. Co., 197 U.S. 183, 193 (1905) (“Many circumstances may exist which may make it necessary and indispensable to the
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claims of creditors where those creditors will not supply services
or material essential to the conduct of the business until their
pre-reorganization claims have been paid.”286 Under the necessity
of payment doctrine, if a prepetition creditor, by refusing to deal
with the debtor during reorganization unless its prepetition claims
are paid, “threatens to make continued operations impossible,”
then “as a matter of economic necessity” the debtor in possession
“may properly be permitted to pay such claims, even out of the corpus of the estate.”287 The benefit of the debtor’s continued operations is presumed.288
business of the road and the preservation of the property, for the receiver to
pay pre-existing debts of certain classes, out of the earnings of the receivership, or even the corpus of the property, under the order of the court, with a
priority of lien. Yet the discretion to do so should be exercised with very great
care.”); Miltenberger v. Logansport Ry. Co., 106 U.S. 286 (1882). The Chandler Act amended the 1898 Bankruptcy Act to comprehensively provide for
the confirmation of plans that enabled a reorganization pursuant to chapters
X (corporate reorganizations), XI (arrangements), XII (real property arrangements for persons other than corporations), and XIII (wage earners’ plans).
Other 1930s amendments to the Bankruptcy Act included chapter IX (for the
reorganization of municipalities) and section 77 of the Railroad Reorganization Act of 1935 (for the reorganization of railroads). See generally Chandler
Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-696, 52 Stat. 840 (1938) (incorporating the 1934
Amendments and comprehensively enacting reorganization and plan provisions for business entities and individuals) (referred to in text as “Chandler
Act”); Municipal Reorganizations, ch. 657, 50 Stat. 653 (1937); Railroad Reorganization Act of 1935, ch. 774, 49 Stat. 911 (1935); 1934 Amendments to
Bankruptcy Act, Pub. L. No. 73-486, 48 Stat. 1289 (1934) (enacting corporate
reorganization provisions, including § 77(B) for plan confirmation).
286 In re Just for Feet, Inc., 242 B.R. at 825 (Code case) (quoting In re Penn
Cent. Transp. Co., 467 F.2d at 102 n. 1 (Act case)).
287 In re Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 458 F. Supp. 1234, 1326 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
Of course, the necessity of payment rule has special application to railroad
insolvency. The purposes of railroad insolvency proceedings under the equity
receiverships, which gave rise to the necessity of payment rule, went beyond
paying creditors in accordance with distributional priorities. They included
the public’s interest in the continuation of the railroad. See, e.g., Miltenberger
v. Logansport Ry. Co., 106 U.S. 286, 311–12 (1882) (authorizing payment of
prepetition claims to creditors who threatened not to furnish supplies on
credit, unless they were paid the arrearages, because otherwise “the business
of the road would suffer great detriment,” and “the public interest in such a
highway for public use as a railroad” would suffer). Congressional protection
of the public’s interest in a railroad’s continued operations is reflected, even
today, in several provisions of the Code. A railroad is not eligible to be a debtor
under chapter 7, because under chapter 7 the debtor’s operations cease (unless
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The Seventh Circuit in Kmart rejected this presumption
and required a debtor requesting court approval of priority-skipping
first-day payments to prove ultimate benefit to the disfavored
creditors.289 Under the Kmart rule, the debtor must show not only
that the suppliers of goods or services are critical to the debtor’s
operations and would cease deliveries if they are not paid on account
of their prepetition claims, but also that “the disfavored creditors
will be as well off with reorganization as with liquidation.”290
The Kmart rule arose in a case in which the debtor had
pushed the doctrine of necessity to, and arguably beyond, its
limit.291 The bankruptcy court in Kmart had authorized the payment in full for the prepetition claims of 2,330 of the debtor’s
“critical” suppliers at a total cost of $300 million.292 Another 2,000
suppliers were not deemed “critical.”293 They and 43,000 other
unsecured creditors, who also were not deemed critical, ultimately
received only 10¢ on the dollar on account of their claims in the
form of stock in the reorganized Kmart, as compared with the
full payment afforded to the 2,330 “critical” vendors.294
The Seventh Circuit held that a bankruptcy court does
not have the “discretion to set aside the Code’s rules about priority and distribution” when it determines whether to grant firstday relief.295 It rejected the doctrine of necessity as “just a fancy
continued by court order, “for a limited time,” pursuant to Code § 721), and
the debtor’s assets are liquidated. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 109(b) (1), 721 (2012). A
railroad is eligible to file and reorganize under chapter 11, but the court is
required by the Code to consider the public interest—in addition to the interests
of the debtor, its creditors and equity holders—in deciding whether the railroad
will reorganize or liquidate, and other key matters in the case. See 11 U.S.C.
§ 1165 (2012). In particular, the abandonment of a line and the confirmation of a
plan must be consistent with the public interest. See 11 U.S.C. § 1170(a)(2)
(2012); see also 11. U.S.C. § 1173(a)(4) (2012).
288 See Czyzewski, 137 S. Ct. at 978–79.
289 In re Kmart Corp., 359 F.3d at 873.
290 Id.
291 See id. at 868.
292 Id. at 869.
293 Id.
294 Id.
295 In re Kmart Corp., 359 F.3d at 871. The court focused in particular on
§ 105(a), which “allows a bankruptcy court to ‘issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of ’ the Code,”
and held that this section of the Code does not authorize priority-skipping. Id.
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name for a power to depart from the Code.”296 In the Seventh
Circuit’s view, the doctrine of necessity was no longer good law
because it had been supplanted by the provisions of the Code.297
The Seventh Circuit proceeded to formulate a rule that
requires the debtor to show the benefit to the disfavored creditors of the reorganization that the first-day payment ostensibly
would enable.298 The debtor had made no such showing to the
bankruptcy court, and the Seventh Circuit reversed.299
Several bankruptcy courts have embraced Kmart.300 Some
have altered the rule somewhat to require the debtor to show
that the disfavored creditors eventually will be at least as well
off as a result of the first-day payments having been made, regardless of whether the debtor reorganizes or is liquidated.301
Critics of excessive first-day relief express sound concerns.302
Kmart’s payment of $300 million to 2,300 creditors designated
“critical” by the debtor is their poster child.303
Id.
Id.
298 See id. at 873.
299 See id. at 873–74. The court likened its test to the “best interest of creditors” rule, under which any creditor who voted against a chapter 11 plan can
block confirmation of the plan if it would receive less under the plan than it
would receive in a chapter 7 liquidation. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7)(A) (2012).
300 In re Tropical Sportswear Int’l Corp., 320 B.R. at 20 (payment of prepetition amounts to critical vendors can be authorized only if: “(1) those critical
vendors are indeed critical and have refused to do business with a debtor absent
payment; and (2) only if the court finds that the disfavored creditors will be
at least as well off as a result of the court’s granting critical vendor status to
the select vendors.”); In re Corner Home Care, Inc., 438 B.R. at 127, 129 (citing Kmart approvingly and applying United American rule); In re Jeans.com,
Inc., 502 B.R. at 257 (adopting rule of Tropical Sportswear Int’l Corp.); In re
United Am., 327 B.R. at 781–82, 784 (“If there is to be a Doctrine of Necessity,
it must be narrowly construed and sparingly applied,” and include a finding
that “the favorable treatment of the critical vendor must not prejudice other
unsecured creditors.”).
301 Id.
302 Roe & Tung, supra note 251, at 1255; Christopher D. Hunt, Note, NotSo-Critical Vendors: Redefining Critical Vendor Orders, 93 KY. L.J. 915, 935
(2004–2005) (“Critical vendor orders should be eliminated. The only place in
the Bankruptcy Code where their use can be justified is in railroad company
petitions.”).
303 In re Kmart Corp., 359 F.3d at 869.
296
297
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Critical vendor practice, in the words of some commentators, has “mushroomed, with critical vendor (and roll-up) orders
disposing of major portions of estate value.”304 To make matters
worse, the first-day hearing in a chapter 11 case is held a day or
two after the case was filed, on minimal notice to creditors and
other parties in interest, without the possibility of objection from
an unsecured creditors committee (which has not yet been formed),
before the first meeting of creditors has been convened, and, generally, with few parties in the courtroom to advocate for the creditors
who might be disfavored by the payments.305
The Jevic Court, swimming a bit against this tide of criticism, went out of its way to provide support for priority-skipping
first-day relief, albeit in dicta.306 The Court did not resolve the
circuit split or draw a distinction between the doctrine of necessity and its presumption of the benefit of “preserv[ing] the debtor
as a going concern,” and the Seventh Circuit’s Kmart rule which
requires proof that such payments will “make even the disfavored
creditors better off.”307 While the Seventh Circuit in Kmart laid
the blame for excessive first-day relief on the doctrine of necessity,
which in its view harmed disfavored creditors and had no basis
in the Code,308 the Jevic Court showed no sign that it shared
this view.309
Since the Court went as far as it did to provide support for
first-day relief in chapter 11, it might have gone further in its
dicta to suggest a resolution of the circuit split.310 But it did not
and left the issue to the lower courts.311
What rule, then, should courts follow for first-day relief
post-Jevic? I argue in the next Section that the doctrine of necessity’s presumption of benefit compares more favorably than
its critics acknowledge with the highly speculative hypothetical
valuation of ultimate distributions that is required by Kmart.
Roe & Tung, supra note 251, at 1255; Hunt, supra note 302, at 915, 935.
See also Hunt, supra note 302, at 925, 934–35.
306 See Czyzewski, 137 S. Ct. 973, 985–86 (2017).
307 Id.
308 See In re Kmart Corp., 359 F.3d at 871.
309 See Czyzewski, 137 S. Ct. at 984.
310 Id.
311 Id.
304
305
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C. Hypothetical Valuations Under the Doctrine of Necessity
and Kmart
The necessity of payment doctrine and the Seventh Circuit’s
Kmart rule differ in one material respect.312 The doctrine of necessity presumes that the debtor’s continued operation ultimately
will benefit the disfavored creditors.313 Kmart, by comparison, requires the debtor to show that the disfavored creditors will be at
least as well off, and the bankruptcy court to find, based on a series
of hypothetical valuations, that the disfavored creditors ultimately
will not be harmed by the debtor’s continued operations.314
As the Court noted in Jevic, it is difficult in nearly all cases
to make meaningful predictions of final distributional outcomes
in the first days of a chapter 11 case.315 I suggest below that the
hypothetical valuations required by Kmart are so speculative that
the presumption of ultimate creditor benefit under the doctrine
of necessity is preferable.
1. Presumed Going Concern Value and Disfavored
Creditors Under the Doctrine of Necessity
Is the doctrine of necessity, post-Jevic, up to the task of
protecting the disfavored creditors against the excesses of firstday relief? Likely yes.
The determinations that a court must make with respect
to requested first-day relief under the doctrine of necessity are
not that speculative. The court must ask whether the debtor’s
operations will be severely damaged or imperiled if it cannot obtain
the critical good, service or credit, and whether the debtor sought
and failed to obtain an alternative in the market on the same or
better terms than those proposed to be given to the prepetition
creditor by the first-day motion.316 The answers to these questions involve ordinary evidentiary findings of facts that are (or
are not) in existence at a time that is contemporaneous with the
Compare id. at 986, with In re Kmart Corp., 359 F.3d at 873.
See Czyzewski, 137 S. Ct. at 986.
314 See In re Kmart Corp., 359 F.3d at 873.
315 See Czyzewski, 137 S. Ct. at 983.
316 See In re Kmart Corp., 359 F.3d at 873.
312
313
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day of the first-day hearing.317 Whether a critical vendor has a
contractual obligation to continue to supply postpetition under
the terms of a contract—and therefore is not legally entitled to
refuse to perform—is a matter of law that the court can determine based on the evidence of the contract.318
Whether a critical vendor or other creditor, who is not
bound by contract, will continue to supply the debtor with goods,
services, or credit postpetition if it is not paid the full price that
it has demanded, gives rise to a game of chicken that bankruptcy
judges regularly play, often with large and well-represented institutions insisting on harsh terms.319 Sometimes the court balks at
entering the order, and the debtor’s counterparty walks away for
good.320 More often, the debtor and the counterparty renegotiate
and obtain court approval on new terms that are more favorable
than those originally proposed by the vendor to the debtor.321
The doctrine of necessity presumes that disfavored creditors will benefit, or at the very least will not be harmed, by the
debtor’s preserving its operations.322 Congress also made this presumption when it enacted the Chandler Act in 1938 and the Bankruptcy Code in 1978.323 The Kmart rule, in contrast, requires the
Id.
See id. A party to a contract with a debtor, who refuses to perform postbankruptcy unless it is paid on account of a prepetition claim, is in violation
of the automatic stay because the party seeking payment is exercising control
over property of the estate (the contract). 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3) (2012).
319 See also In re Kmart Corp., 359 F.3d at 873–74.
320 See id. at 873.
321 The findings required under the doctrine of necessity are, to a significant
degree, market-based. A supplier of goods and services who has no contract
with a chapter 11 debtor or other counterparty can charge whatever price it can
get. That supplier, in most cases, will not have gained the ability to increase
its price by rent-seeking in the sense of manipulating public policy or economic
conditions as a strategy for increasing profits any more than a wheat farmer
does by charging more when wheat is scarce or an airline does when it has
nearly filled the plane. The bargain sought by the supplier who is not bound by a
prepetition contract, while distasteful to some and perhaps onerous to others, is
market-driven.
322 See also Czyzewski, 137 S. Ct. at 977.
323 The strength of the presumption of the benefit of the preservation of going concern value was recognized by Congress when it enacted the Code, and
is stressed by the Supreme Court in its bankruptcy jurisprudence. Indeed, the
presumption predates the Code. It was key to the comprehensive enactment
317
318
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debtor to show, and the bankruptcy court to find, that the creditors
not being paid will be as well off under a hypothetical reorganization plan confirmed at the end of the case as they would be
under a hypothetical liquidation of the debtor’s assets.324 But on
application, the rules are remarkably similar.
First, the doctrine of necessity addresses the abuses of firstday relief in nearly every instance without resort to the hypothetical valuation of end-of-case benefit required by Kmart.325
Indeed, the payments reversed by the Seventh Circuit in Kmart
would have failed under the doctrine of necessity because the bankruptcy court had made no finding that the vendors proposed to
be paid were critical to Kmart’s continued operations.326 “All the
order did was authorize Kmart to pay any vendor that Kmart in
its discretion deemed ‘critical.’”327 The bankruptcy court also failed
to find “that any firm would have ceased doing business with Kmart
if not paid for pre-petition deliveries, and the scant record would
not have supported such a finding had one been made.”328 In
addition, many of the allegedly critical vendors—including the
recipient of the largest critical vendor payment—had long-term
of the reorganization provisions of the Chandler Act that preceded the Code. See,
e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 6179 (1977). Regarding the 1978 Bankruptcy Code:
The purpose of a business reorganization case, unlike a liquidation case, is to restructure a business’s finances so that it may
continue to operate, provide its employees with jobs, pay its creditors, and produce a return for its stockholders. The premise
of a business reorganization is that assets that are used for
production in the industry for which they were designed are
more valuable than those same assets sold for scrap … It is more
economically efficient to reorganize than to liquidate, because
it preserves jobs and assets.
Knoeller, supra note 43, at 14 (for business enterprises, the reorganization
provisions of the Chandler Act “embodie[d] the new social economic concept of
reorganization and the rehabilitation of the debtor and his business as a
going concern, instead of the liquidation, distribution, and stoppage of business with the consequent loss to the debtor, creditors, employees, and the
public generally.”).
324 See In re Kmart Corp., 359 F.3d at 872.
325 See id. at 870–71, 874 (discussing hypothetical scenarios involving
preference-recovery actions and reorganization).
326 See id. at 874.
327 Id. at 870.
328 Id. at 874.
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contracts with the debtor.329 Such vendors were legally required
to continue to supply the debtor under the contract postpetition,
and “the automatic stay prevent[ed] these vendors from walking
away as long as the debtor pa[id] [them] for new deliveries.”330
The critical vendor motion in Kmart, simply, failed under the
doctrine of necessity.
Second, the rules are similar because each considers whether
similarly situated creditors who do not receive a first-day distribution will benefit, nonetheless, by the preservation of the debtor’s operations and going concern value.331 The difference is that
the doctrine of necessity presumes such benefit.332 Kmart by
comparison requires a bankruptcy court to make several highly
speculative findings and hypothetical valuations at the first-day
hearing, to determine whether such benefit exists.333 The uncertainty and logistical difficulties in reaching these findings and
See id. at 873.
See id. The Supreme Court also responded by issuing Bankruptcy Rule
6003 in 2007 to provide some further check on the excesses that the Seventh
Circuit criticized in 2004. That Rule provides that, “[e]xcept to the extent that
relief is necessary to avoid immediate and irreparable harm,” a bankruptcy
court cannot, within twenty-one days after the filing of the petition, issue an
order authorizing the use of estate property to pay “all or any part of a claim
that arose before the filing of the petition.” FED. R. BANKR. P. 6003(b). See FED.
R. BANKR. P. 6003 Notes, archived at Cornell Law School, https://www.law
.cornell.edu/rules/frbp/rule_6003 [https://perma.cc/EHG9-HQKS]; FED. R.
BANKR. P. 6003 Committee Notes on Rules—2007, archived at Cornell Law
School, https://www.law.cornell.edu/rules/frbp/rule_6003 [https://perma.cc/EH
G9 -HQKS].
331 See generally FED. R. BANKR. P. 6003 (describing case-applications for
employment motions); In re Kmart Corp., 359 F.3d at 866.
332 Russell A. Eisenberg & Frances F. Gecker, The Doctrine of Necessity
and Its Parameters, 73 MARQ. L. REV. at 4 (1989) (the doctrine of necessity is
“premised on the bankruptcy goal of maintaining the prospects for a viable
reorganization during the early stages of a case” and “embod[ies] the fact that
there are some prepetition creditors who must be paid immediately because if
they are not paid, everyone else will suffer.”).
333 Compare In re Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 467 F.2d at 102 n. 1 (Act case)
(the necessity of payment doctrine “permit[s] immediate payment of claims of
creditors where those creditors will not supply services or material essential
to the conduct of the business until their pre-reorganization claims shall have
been paid.”), with In re Kmart Corp., 359 F.3d at 873 (requiring a debtor show
“that the disfavored creditors will be as well off with reorganization as with
liquidation—a demonstration never attempted in this proceeding”).
329
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valuations are considered below and, in the end, are not that different from the presumption of benefit that is made under the
doctrine of necessity.334
2. Hypothetical Valuations and the Kmart Rule
Commentators and some courts lauded Kmart for reigning
in excessive first-day priority-skipping relief, and perhaps with
good reason on the facts of that case.335 But is the Kmart rule an
effective solution to such excesses? Likely not.
Hypothetical, judicial valuations inherently fall far short of
determining actual, market values.336 The hypothetical valuations
required by Kmart are wildly speculative at best.337
The Seventh Circuit in Kmart required a debtor to demonstrate, and a bankruptcy court to find, that the disfavored creditors will be as well off with the reorganization that was enabled
by the first-day payments as with liquidation that will result if
the first-day payments are not authorized and the debtor’s operations cease.338 The court did not consider how this valuation was
to be obtained, it stated simply that the debtor never attempted
such a demonstration in the bankruptcy court.339 I consider, in
the following paragraphs, the hypothetical valuation that must
be made to satisfy this requirement, and conclude that it is of
inconsequential probative value.
In some rare cases, a chapter 11 debtor’s prospects may be so dim from
the outset that preserving its operations will harm creditors. Chapter 11’s
presumption that the debtor’s continuing to operate ultimately will benefit all
creditors is rebuttable in such cases, under § 1112, which recognizes that the
bankruptcy court may dismiss that debtor’s chapter 11 case or convert it to a
chapter 7 liquidation. 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b) (2012). A rebuttable presumption of
the benefit of continuing operations for the purpose of first-day relief is, I urge,
more in line with Congress’s findings and purposes when it enacted the chapter
11 provisions of the Code. Shifting the burden of proof to the debtor on this issue
at the first-day hearing in the case is not.
335 Roe & Tung, supra note 251, at 1257.
336 See Douglas G. Baird & Donald S. Bernstein, Absolute Priority, Valuation
Uncertainty, and the Reorganization Bargain, 115 YALE L.J. 1930, 1941–42 (2006)
(detailing the difficulties involved in valuing a business).
337 Id.
338 In re Kmart Corp., 359 F.3d at 872–73.
339 Id. at 873.
334
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The bankruptcy judge actually must make two different
hypothetical valuations under Kmart, each of which requires a
number of guesses and assumptions: for the first valuation, the
judge must assume that the first-day payments are not made, and
then determine the amount of distributions to creditors if the
debtor’s assets were liquidated at the beginning of the case;340
for the second valuation, the judge must assume that the first-day
payments are made, and then must project the ultimate resulting
estate value and creditor distributions under a hypothetical reorganization plan—that the bankruptcy court predicts it could confirm as of an indefinite time that is months or years in the future.341
The first valuation is the simpler one. The bankruptcy judge,
to satisfy the Kmart rule, must determine the present value of
the debtor’s assets and business on a liquidation, without any exposure of those assets to the market.342 She then must quantify the
claims against those assets, by amount and priority—in most cases
before the debtor’s schedules listing those claims have been filed,
before the debtor has been examined on those schedules at the first
meeting of creditors, before most creditors have filed proofs of
claims, and before the claims allowance process by which claims are
allowed or disallowed has even commenced.343 These uncertainties
See infra Section III.C.
Id.
342 See generally In re Kmart Corp., 359 F.3d at 868.
343 The bankruptcy judge at a first-day hearing has very little evidence on
which to base a determination of the ultimate distributional outcomes in a chapter
11 case. Almost all of the information needed to make this determination comes
later. A chapter 11 debtor, for example, is not required to file the schedules or
other information regarding its assets and liabilities until 14 days of the filing of a
voluntary case. 11 U.S.C. § 521(a) (2012); FED. R. BANKR. P. 1007(b). That deadline
can be extended by the court, for cause shown. FED. R. BANKR. P. 1007(c). And
those schedules are just the debtor’s side of its financial story. The United States
trustee does not examine the debtor with respect to that financial information
until the meeting of creditors that it convenes, within “a reasonable time” after
the filing of the voluntary petition, on not less than twenty-one days’ notice to all
creditors who at the meeting also may question the debtor. 11 U.S.C. § 341(a)
(2012); FED. R. BANKR. P. 2002(a)(1). Creditors also are entitled to file claims
against the debtor, which often are in addition to or different from the claims
listed by the debtor in its schedules. The deadline for filing those proofs claim in
a chapter 11 case, i.e., the “bar date,” comes later, and is fixed by the court,
typically on the filing of the debtor’s motion on twenty-one days’ notice to creditors.
FED. R. BANKR. P 3003(c). Creditors then are entitled to another twenty-one days’
notice of the bar date, so that they have due time to prepare and file their claims.
FED. R. BANKR. P 2002(a)(7). The debtor then can object to the proofs of claim.
340
341
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in nearly all but a pre-packaged chapter 11 case will overwhelm
the probative worth of the valuation.
The harder part for the judge comes next, though. She
must hypothetically value the debtor’s business on a going concern basis—as of the indeterminate time, months or years in the
future, at which she predicts that the debtor’s reorganization plan
will be confirmed.344 And she must then, somehow, also determine
the distributions that will be made to creditors under that suppositional plan that has not yet been filed and the terms of which
have not yet been proposed to or negotiated with the debtor’s
creditors, owners and other parties in interest.345
In the end, all methods for hypothetically valuing a business “are merely estimates of the present value of the business’s
future earning capacity.”346 The value of a non-fungible asset
such as a business cannot be determined with any precision unless it is properly marketed to potential buyers and then is sold
to the highest bidder for the asset.347 This second valuation required by Kmart involves no exposure to the market; it begins
with guesswork at best, of a projected future value of the firm.348
And the difficulties with this second, future hypothetical valuation do not end there. Chapter 11 plans are not predetermined
or formulaic.349 A debtor can propose a plan350 or, after expiration
of the exclusive period within which only the debtor may propose a
plan, any creditor or other party in interest can propose one, including a chapter 11 trustee if one has been appointed.351 The proponent of the plan determines the classes of creditors and holders
FED. R. BANKR. P 3007. The court ultimately either allows the claim, in whole or
in part, or disallows it. The process described above occurs over a period of months
or years after the first-day hearing in a typical chapter 11 case. Determining
the aggregate claims against the estate early in the case is further complicated
because many claims are unliquidated (such as unresolved contract and tort
claims) at the that time, and many claims have not yet arisen (such as damage claims arising from the rejection of executory contracts and leases).
344 In re Kmart Corp., 359 F.3d at 873 (“it is necessary to show… that the disfavored creditors will be as well off with reorganization as with liquidation”).
345 Id.
346 Baird & Bernstein, supra note 336, at 1941–42.
347 Id.
348 See generally In re Kmart Corp., 359 F.3d at 868.
349 See 11 U.S.C. § 1121 (2012).
350 Id.
351 §§ 1122–23.
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of equity interests, and the treatment of the claims interests
within each of those classes, within the Code’s somewhat flexible
parameters.352 Confirmation of a consensual plan which all voting classes have voted to accept has fewer requirements than
does a cramdown plan (which at least one voting class has voted
for, but which one or more classes have voted against).353 But the
plan’s terms bind dissenting creditors within a class that votes
for a plan that the bankruptcy court confirms regardless.354 As a
result of these factors and others, the distributions to creditors
and equity on account of their claims and interests under a plan
are the result of negotiations that can take months or even years
to conclude, punctuated in a complex case by periodic litigation over
issues that have a material bearing on the terms of the plan.355
For all of these reasons, the ultimate terms of a reorganization
plan in a typical chapter 11 case are shrouded, at the beginning
of a case, in a haze of uncertainty.356
The Kmart valuation also requires the bankruptcy judge to
speculate on when the plan providing for the distributions to creditors will be confirmed.357 This finding by the judge is based on
mere conjecture, unless the debtor negotiated a “pre-packaged”
plan with its creditors prior to filing the case.358
As a result of these assumptions that the bankruptcy
judge must make, which in most cases are nearly arbitrary, the
quality of the hypothetical valuations under Kmart will be very
weak. The finest crystal ball will give the judge little guidance.
Moreover, if the judge has determined that not paying the allegedly critical creditors will cause immediate and irreparable harm by
threatening the debtor’s operations and existence, then she will
need to make all of these valuations at a first-day hearing, without
Id.
§ 1129(b)(1).
354 § 1126(c)(d).
355 See supra notes 363–71 and accompanying text.
356 See id.
357 See infra Section III.C.2.
358 Id. Under a typical prepackaged plan in current chapter 11 practice,
the secured debt is consensually restructured, unsecured debt “rides through,”
i.e., is paid in full in the ordinary course of the debtor’s business operations, and
the equity in the reorganized company is issued to the secured debtholders who
agreed to the restructuring. Because the unsecured creditors are not impaired,
the absolute priority rule is satisfied with respect to them.
352
353
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the extensive advocacy and evidentiary record that informs most
complex judicial decisions.359
The Seventh Circuit in Kmart recognized that a judge, to
confirm a chapter 11 plan, must conduct a similar comparison of
distributions on liquidation as opposed to distributions under the
plan.360 That comparison, called the “best interest of creditors”
test, requires the judge to find that any creditor who voted against
the chapter 11 plan will receive a distribution under the plan that is
not less than the amount that it would receive if the debtor were
liquidated under chapter 7.361
But the “best interest of creditors” determination for plan
confirmation under the Code is made by the judge after the terms
of the plan have been negotiated, reduced to writing, filed, submitted to, and analyzed by the judge and by the debtor’s creditors
and other parties in interest.362 The filings made in connection
with the plan must include a liquidation analysis prepared by
the plan proponent’s accountants or financial advisors, against
which the judge can compare the distributions to creditors and
equity on a hypothetical chapter 7 liquidation against the distributions to creditors and equity provided for in the plan.363 Creditors and other parties in interest may object and be heard on the
issue of whether the “best interest of creditors” requirement has
been met.364 The judge has the advantage of considering all of
this information and these objections in a contested proceeding
prior to reaching her decision.365 Further, the two outcomes that
the judge must compare in applying the “best interest of creditors” test at confirmation are for the most part contemporaneous,
requiring near-term predictions on liquidation prices compared
to the distributions to creditors that are set forth in detail in the
chapter 11 plan.366
FED. R. BANKR. PROC. 6003(b).
In re Kmart Corp., 359 F.3d at 872–73.
361 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7)(A) (2012). The Seventh Circuit likened the second
prong of its rule to this requirement for plan confirmation.
362 See § 1123 (delineating the contents a plan must have for presentment
to the judge).
363 § 1129(a)(7)(A).
364 FED. R. BANKR. P. 2002(b).
365 Id.
366 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7)(A) (2012).
359
360
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The bankruptcy judge, in sum, has a far smaller task in
determining, at plan confirmation, whether the “best interest of
creditors” requirement has been satisfied than he has under the
Kmart rule.367 The point in time for comparison (plan confirmation) and the terms of the plan are no longer speculative, and a far
greater advocacy over a lengthy period of time is associated with
the court’s decision.368 Courts and commentators recognize nonetheless that the hypothetical liquidation-to-reorganization comparison that must be made to satisfy the “best interest of creditors”
requirement at the chapter 11 plan confirmation hearing “is not
an exact science and must in part be based on reasonable assumptions and ‘best guesses.’”369 The proof required by Kmart by
comparison will in most cases be based on arbitrary assumptions and wild guesses.370
The Seventh Circuit’s reversal in Kmart turned on the
debtor’s failure to offer any evidence that the creditors who were
not paid on the first-day would be as well off under a hypothetical reorganization plan as they would be under a hypothetical
liquidation of the debtor’s assets.371 One can view Kmart as doing nothing more than shifting a burden of proof.372 The court
declined to presume, as a court may under the doctrine of necessity, that a priority-skipping first-day payment that preserves the
debtor’s operations and going concern value is sufficiently likely
to benefit even the disadvantaged creditors.373 Instead, under
Kmart, the debtor must prove it.374
Given how hypothetical any such proof of ultimate distributional outcomes will be at the first-day hearing in a chapter
11 case, it is hardly surprising that neither Kmart nor any case
which has purported to follow it has turned on the quality of such
proof.375 Rather, the Seventh Circuit and such other courts have
CHARLES JORDAN TABB, THE LAW OF BANKRUPTCY 1138 (2d ed. 2009) (citing
In re Crowthers McCall Pattern, Inc., 120 B.R. 279 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990)).
368 See supra notes 379–84 and accompanying text.
369 Id.
370 See id.
371 In re Kmart Corp., 359 F.3d at 873.
372 Id. at 865.
373 Id.
374 Id.
375 Id. at 868; see infra note 393 and accompanying text.
367
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based their decisions on: (1) whether the debtor proved that it could
not find a market alternative (the inquiry at the heart of the doctrine of necessity); and/or (2) whether the debtor had offered any
evidence regarding ultimate distributional outcomes for skippedover creditors in a hypothetical reorganization as compared with
a hypothetical liquidation test.376
376 See id. at 873 (debtor “never attempted” to show either that the critical
vendors would have ceased deliveries absent the payment or that the disfavored
creditors would be as well off with reorganization as with liquidation); In re
Tropical Sportswear Int’l Corp., 320 B.R. at 17, 19–21 (purportedly following
Kmart, yet presuming, as does the doctrine of necessity, that if the debtor is
“unable to continue in business without the continued supply” of the critical
products, then, “[i]n such cases, even the disfavored creditors are better off by
paying the critical vendors since the payments enable a successful reorganization;” the court also speculated that the disadvantaged creditors would benefit
because the critical vendors were being paid only a percentage of their claims
and were waiving the balance other than their “valid reclamation claims” which
would be paid in full, so that “the exact discount” to the debtors was “yet to be
determined”); In re Jeans.com, Inc., 502 B.R. at 257, 259 (following Tropical
Sportswear, yet presuming that “the disfavored creditors [were] better off by
paying the critical vendors since the payments enable[d] a successful reorganization ....” There was no evidence regarding the predicted distributions to
skipped-over creditors on a hypothetical reorganization.). The court in United
American considered a critical vendor motion, filed six weeks after the chapter
11 case was commenced, in which the debtor asserted that two vendors were
“essential for the debtor’s continued operation and successful reorganization,”
and that the court should authorize payment of the vendors’ prepetition claims
under the doctrine of necessity. After an evidentiary hearing, the court denied
the motion as to one vendor and granted it as to the other, “not on the basis of
the Doctrine of Necessity, but as an assumption of an executory contract.” The
court nonetheless cited Kmart for the proposition that the doctrine of necessity
was easily abused and “[i]f there is to be a Doctrine of Necessity, it must be
narrowly construed and sparingly applied.” Regarding the vendors at issue, the
court found that the question of prejudice to creditors was resolved by the determination of whether the goods or services were essential, and whether the price
paid by the debtor was too high. In re United Am., 327 B.R. at 783–84. And in
In re Corner Home Care, Inc., while the court cited Kmart and United American favorably for the proposition that “the favorable treatment of the critical
vendor must not prejudice other unsecured creditors,” it denied the motion
because the debtor failed to show that there was no alternative supplier of the
goods, or that the asserted critical supplier would not supply the goods unless
it received payment of its prepetition claim. In re Corner Home Care, Inc., 438
B.R. at 128. The bankruptcy court in In re Pioneer Health Services, Inc., decided
post-Jevic, similarly denied the debtor’s motion to make critical vendor payments to physicians because there was no evidence that the physicians were
irreplaceable, or could or would stop working if they were not paid. It did not
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There will be some extraordinary cases in which the bankruptcy court’s first-day predictions required by Kmart of the ultimate net benefit to creditors are plausible notwithstanding these
difficulties. This might be the case if the first-day payments of
prepetition claims to critical creditors are so high, and the prospects
for meaningful returns to the disfavored creditors that might result
from the debtor’s continuing to operate and reorganize are so low,
that a prompt liquidation of the debtor’s assets is preferable. This
might be the case where the debtor is “dead on arrival,” and there
simply is no reasonable prospect of a reorganization. It also might
be the case with respect to a prepackaged plan. But in nearly all
other cases, the opposite will hold. The variables will be so numerous, the assumptions will be so arbitrary, and the ultimate
outcomes will be so uncertain, that the hypothetical valuations
required by Kmart will be nearly if not entirely meaningless.377
D. First-Day Relief After Jevic
The Jevic Court did not resolve the circuit split between
the doctrine of necessity and the Kmart rule.378 But, though arguably dictum, the Court’s message was clear: “One can generally
find significant Code-related objectives” for first-day relief “that
the priority-violating distributions serve,” whether preserving the
debtor as a going concern, as required by the doctrine of necessity,
or making “even the disfavored creditors better off,” as required
by Kmart.379 The Court left it at that, declining to embrace the
hypothetical valuations required by Kmart.380
The inadequacy of such hypothetical valuations and the
efficacy of market exposure to address the problems of control
premiums and collusion is an analytic theme of the Court’s last
two absolute priority rule cases—in Jevic when it second-guessed
the bankruptcy court’s determination, made without market exposure, that the settled claim had little value, and in 203 N. LaSalle
consider the likelihood of eventual benefit or detriment to the other creditors
who were not receiving the first-day payments. In re Pioneer Health Services,
Inc., 570 B.R. 228, 235–36 (Bankr. S.D. Miss. 2017).
377 Baird & Bernstein, supra note 336, at 1941–42.
378 Czyzewski, 137 S. Ct. at 987–88 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
379 Id. at 985 (citing In re Kmart Corp., 359 F.3d at 872).
380 See generally id. at 973.
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when it reversed because the equity in the new debtor had not
been marketed.381 The Court accepted as a given the difficulty of
applying the rule of priorities to first-day relief or other interim
transactions in a chapter 11 case, because the nature and extent
of the estate and the claims against it are not yet fully resolved
and thus, I suggest, can be valued only hypothetically.382
Jevic did not discard the doctrine of necessity as a relic of
pre-Code law, nor did it disparage Kmart.383 Jevic does suggest,
though, that a bankruptcy court’s finding that first-day relief will
“make even the disfavored creditors better off” does not require
hypothetical future valuations of a chapter 11 debtor’s business
or assets, or projections of the ultimate distributions to creditors.384
More likely, chapter 11’s presumption that continued operations
and preservation of going concern value will benefit all creditors
should suffice.385
This approach addresses the excessive first-day relief of
which some critics, rightfully, complain.386 It does this by requiring evidentiary proof that the relief is essential to the debtor’s
operations, and that the debtor sought and could not obtain an alternative on better terms, in the market.387 This proof will consist,
in most cases, of credible testimony that the critical vendor has
refused to provide a good, service or credit essential its operations unless it is paid on account of its prepetition claims, and that
the debtor diligently contacted alternative suppliers, none of
whom would provide the good, service or credit on better terms
than those demanded by the critical vendor.388
It dispenses, though, with the wildly speculative hypothetical
predictions of future value and distributions, based on facts largely
Id. at 983; 203 N. LaSalle, 526 U.S. at 466–69.
Czyzewski, 137 S. Ct. at 985.
383 Id. at 985, 986.
384 Id. at 985 (quoting In re Kmart Corp., 359 F.3d at 872).
385 Id. at 977.
386 See Roe & Tung, supra note 251.
387 This evidentiary requirement is not very different from the evidentiary
requirement for approval of postpetition borrowing under Code section 364.
Under that section, for example, a debtor in possession cannot obtain approval of
a loan secured by a lien in its assets unless it proves that it could not obtain
the loan on an unsecured basis. 11 U.S.C. § 364(c) (2012).
388 Id.
381
382
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undeveloped at a first-day hearing, that the Seventh Circuit required.389 It replaces these hypothetical valuations with the Congressional presumption of going concern value that, for nearly a
century, has been at the core of reorganization law in the U.S.390
IV. VALUATION UNCERTAINTY, LEGAL CERTAINTY, AND THE
ABSOLUTE PRIORITY RULE
“The result is uncertainty,” the Jevic Court emphasized
when it declined to create a “rare case” exception to the absolute
priority rule for case-ending settlements in chapter 11.391 This
uncertainty, the Court continued, alters the parties’ leverage and
makes settlements more difficult to achieve.392
Market exposure can in many cases provide that certainty,
which hypothetical predictions and valuations cannot, with respect
to both first-day relief and interim and other pre-plan settlements
and transactions in chapter 11.393 Such market certainty enables a court to determine to a greater legal certainty the value of
the good, service, or credit being offered by an allegedly critical
vendor in exchange for a proposed first-day distribution, the value
of a claim or other estate asset that is the subject of such settlement
or transaction, and whether a control premium is being paid from
estate assets.
In re Kmart Corp., 369 F.3d at 872–73.
Knoeller, supra note 43, at 14; H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 120 (1977).
391 Czyzewski, 137 S. Ct. at 986.
392 Id. at 987 (citing RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank,
566 U.S. 639, 649 (2012); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Legal Precedent: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 19 J. LAW & ECON. 249, 271 (1976)).
393 The transition from hypothetical to market valuations of a debtor’s business already has occurred to a great extent in U.S. bankruptcy law and practice
with the rise and development of the court-approved going concern sale under
Code section 363(b). The business in larger chapter 11 cases most often is
valued, not by plan negotiations over hypothetical values, but by court-approved
auction procedures. The business, once sold, has new owners, new secured
financing (often enabling both the business’ acquisition by the new owners
and its post-sale operations), and new unsecured creditors with respect to goods
and services obtained by the business on credit post-sale. Because it is no longer in
the debtor’s estate, bankruptcy court supervision ends, and the reorganization
and restructuring of the business is done. The fund arising from the acquirer’s
paying the purchase price is then distributed to creditors of the debtor’s estate,
either pursuant to a liquidating plan, or if a plan cannot be confirmed, by a trustee
following conversion to chapter 7.
389
390
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This certainty is obtained, for requested first-day relief,
by requiring a debtor to seek a market alternative for the good,
service or credit at issue, coupled with a rebuttable presumption
that creditors will benefit if the debtor’s business is preserved as
a going concern. This certainty is lost if first-day decisions are
based on hypothetical projections of the distributions that will be
made to creditors under an imaginary plan postulated to be confirmed months or perhaps years later.
Certainty also is obtained for a proposed interim or pre-plan
settlement or other transaction once it is exposed to the market.
The value of estate property becomes certain, as the Court recognized in both Jevic and 203 N. LaSalle, when the assets are exposed
to the market.394 A properly marketed sale ends the uncertainty
about what something is worth. The battle of experts in a hypothetical valuation proceeding does not. Determining value by exposing a settlement or other transaction with an insider or other
controlling entity to competing bids also enables a court to determine whether a control premium is being paid in violation of
a fundamental policy behind the absolute priority rule.
This ultimate certainty also is likely to encourage negotiations, over the terms of first-day relief, and over an interim or
other pre-plan settlement or other disposition of a claim or asset,
and the distribution of estate property among parties who have
different priority positions. Parties in chapter 11 often bargain
in the midst of valuation uncertainty, knowing that the values at
issue must at some time become certain. A party can be expected to
bargain more efficiently—cognizant of its weaknesses as well as
its strengths—if it knows that marketing is imminent or ongoing,
and that this market exposure will preclude with certainty both
a below-market sale and the payment of a control premium.
CONCLUSION
The Jevic Court mapped the sea from the dry land to a
great extent. The firm ground is clearly defined—at the end of a
chapter 11 case, strict compliance with distributional priorities
generally is required for non-consensual distributions made outside of a plan (such as pursuant to a structured dismissal).395
394
395

Czyzewski, 137 S. Ct. at 978–79; 203 N. LaSalle, 526 U.S. at 455.
Czyzewski, 137 S. Ct. at 986.
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The Court, though, left mostly uncharted the vast sea in
which one finds transactions that are not case-ending, such as
interim and other pre-plan settlements and transactions, firstday orders, and the distributions made under them.396 The Court
plotted, instead, a wide course around two shoals created by circuit
splits on the issue of distributions that are not case-ending, leaving them mostly unmarked.397
The first circuit split that the Court did not resolve was
whether there is a per se rule that requires absolute distributional priority for interim and other pre-plan settlements and
transactions in chapter 11. The Court on this issue emphasized
the difficulty of hypothetically assessing such a settlement or other
transaction that is not case-ending, because the “extent of the
Estate and the claims against it are not yet fully resolved.”398 Still,
it suggested, bankruptcy courts approving even these settlements
and transactions must show a proper solicitude—or at least not
show an outright disregard—for the absolute priority rule.399
The other unresolved split was the ground for approving
first-day distributions in chapter 11 that may be priority-skipping.
The doctrine of necessity presumes the benefit of preserving the
debtor’s operations, while the Seventh Circuit’s Kmart decision
requires a bankruptcy court to make a finding that such payments
ultimately will benefit (or at least will not harm) the remaining
creditors who do not receive a first-day payment.400 The Court
on this issue indicated that priority-skipping first-day relief and
distributions often serve some significant Code-related purpose,
such as preserving the debtor’s operations in order to maximize
value and enable a reorganization.401 It said nothing, though, of
whether a bankruptcy court can presume, or instead must require proof of, such benefit.
The Court in both Jevic and 203 N. LaSalle more firmly
expressed unease with transactions approved on a record devoid of
evidence of market exposure and based instead on a hypothetical
See id. at 973.
Id. at 987–88 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
398 Id. at 985.
399 Id. at 986.
400 Id. at 985.
401 Id.
396
397
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valuation.402 A bankruptcy court assessing a transaction hypothetically, without market exposure, cannot determine with a
reasonable degree of certainty whether the value of the estate is
being misallocated to parties who exercise control over a debtor
and to those who colluded with them.403
The course toward the rules for approval of pre-plan settlements and transactions and first-day distributions becomes more
certain, I suggest, with these markers left by the Court in Jevic
and 203 N. LaSalle kept in view.
Exposing to market scrutiny the estate claims and other
assets proposed to be released or transferred pursuant to a transaction challenged as benefiting an insider or other party exercising control can throw into strong relief whether a control premium
is being paid at the expense of the estate and the parties who
are not in on the deal, and can thus cast light on the shadows in
which collusion may have occurred.404 This sale process in most
cases will provide reliable evidence that no part of the estate is going to those exercising control or those who colluded with them,
and will result, in many cases, in a higher and better bid for the
claim or other asset at issue.405
This approach, especially with respect to first-day relief,
also entails acknowledging both that market exposure is not always
possible, and the extent to which the hypothetical valuations that
might be used in its stead are unreliable.406 This recognition does
not leave the question of first-day relief at sea. Rather, a bankruptcy court can determine whether a chapter 11 debtor sought
and failed to obtain a market alternative to what is being provided by the party who would receive the priority-skipping distribution under the requested first-day order.407 The issue of
whether the parties not receiving such first-day distributions will
benefit is best addressed, I suggest, not by the highly speculative
determination of the ultimate distributions that the bankruptcy
court hypothesizes will be made at the end of the case, but by a
See Czyzewski, 137 S. Ct. at 978–79; 203 N. LaSalle, 526 U.S. at 455–57.
Czyzewski, 137 S. Ct. at 985; 203 N. LaSalle, 526 U.S. at 436, 457–58.
404 Czyzewski, 137 S. Ct. at 985.
405 Baird & Bernstein, supra note 336, at 1943.
406 Id. at 1941–42.
407 See In re Kmart Corp., 359 F.3d at 872–74; In re Corner Home Care, Inc.,
438 B.R. at 127.
402
403

2018]

ABSOLUTE PRIORITY REDUX

137

rebuttable presumption that preserving a chapter 11 debtor’s
operations in order to maximize value and enable a reorganization ultimately will benefit those creditors more than if the firstday payments had not been made and the debtor’s operations
had ceased.
Distributional priorities and the problem of control premiums that deviate from them have been at the epicenter of U.S.
bankruptcy law for 150 years.408 Still, the extent to which the
absolute priority rule applies to interim and pre-plan settlements
and transactions and to first-day relief is not mapped by the Code.
It has been sketched but lightly by the Jevic Court.409 I suggest
that the approaches outlined in this Paper can address in many
cases the issues that the absolute priority rule was created to
remedy. Market exposure of the claims and other assets that are
the subject of such interim settlements and transactions can preclude to a great extent misallocations of estate value to those in
control. Market exposure of the good, service or credit proposed to
be provided by an asserted critical provider pursuant to first-day
relief can preclude misallocations of estate value to providers
who are not critical. Maximizing the use of these approaches, and
reducing speculative, hypothetical determinations of asset values and creditor distributions, also can provide the certainty sought
by the Jevic Court in this area of U.S. bankruptcy law.
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